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This dissertation primari Iy focuses on the problem of custom or 'urf and its 
treatment as a marginal source in Muslim legal theory or w~fjf al-fiqh. This is 
done by engaging the discourse of Muslim jurists and their pronouncements 
~ 
on 'urf (custom). In particular, I focus on the views of Ibn 'Abidin, a 
11 
seventeenth century l:ianafi scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, on clJstom. This 
is contrasted with two additional jurists to provide a comparative twist to Ibn 
'Abidin's discourse on 'urf. 
The normative structure of Islamic law or sharta, is based on primary and 
secondary sources. In this scheme, the Our'an and Sunnah (traditions of the 
prophet), constitute the primary sources, whereas principles such as /jma' 
(consensus of jurists) and Oiyas (use of analogy) are deemed secondary 
sources. Within this context, in the discourse of Muslim jurists, turf is viewed 
as an auxiliary source of law in the absence of evidence from the normative 
primary and other secondary sources. 
Given the above context, that is, the hierarchy in the structure of what 
constitutes sources of law in Islamic jurisprudence, the crux of this 
dissertation is to problematise this accepted "normative" hierarchy of sources. 
In this instance, the dissertation engages some of the epistemological 
foundations of Islamic jurisprudence. My view here is that, except for a few, 
most works on Islamic law or jurisprudence have not extensively treated the 
problem of its epistemology. And where the treatment is extensive, it is 
usually trapped by the constraints of a conservative discourse. Such a 
discourse does not question the logic of the "normative paradigm" (on the 
hierarchy of sources) but only authenticates it, thus justifying the views of 
classical jurists. 
In the light of the above, the study of 'urf or custom as a source of Islamic 
law, is constrained by the imperative to satisfy classical legal theories on its 
status. Subsequently, attempts to deliberate on turf as a legitimate source 











vantagepoint of 'urf or custom this dissertation highlights this epistemological 
crisis albeit in a limited sense. 
In addition to the aforementioned, this dissertation situates the theme of 
'urf or custom within the broader theories on the study of religion. Invoking 
the theme of "tradition", 'urf and how it impacts on the definition of the Islamic 
tradition is further nuanced. The focus here is on whether traditions are 
capable or incapable of inventing or reinventing themselves. In this context 
turf is mediated through the idiom of "tradition." Here I argue that 'urf as 
tradition is a dynamic and fluid concept, capable of transforming itself to meet 
the contextual and contemporary exigencies as opposed to an archaic and 
immutable concept. In particular, I try to show that 'urfis at the centre of legal 
discourse of most Muslim jurists as much as they deny this. Based on this 
postulation, I then try to show the centrality of 'Ult as a legitimate, if not 
primary, source of law. This is in sharp contrast to the hitherto normative 
status traditionally assigned to it, that is, only viewing it as an auxiliary 
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No law in any society, even in a religious one, is ever stagnant. 
It develops with the development of the society. Islamic law, although 
authoritative, is not rigid by nature. It does not, of course, change very 
rapidly. Its development is very slow and imperceptible. 
_ Ahmad Hassan 1 
The Problem 
Notwithstanding the above quote, that Islamic law "is not rigid by nature", but 
flexible and changes with times and context, Islamic legal scholarship in most 
instances promotes the opposing view. In other words, most scholars writing 
on the subject tend to present Islamic law as static and stagnant. This is 
nowhere evident than in the treatment of custom, that is, 'urf, as a source of 
Islamic law. 
It is not an exaggeration to state that in the study of Islamic law, no other 
subject has received such scant attention than 'urf (custom), alternatively 
referred to as 'ada2 as a source of Islamic law. The assertion that 'urfhas 
been treated marginally in the general discourse on what constitutes sources 
of Islamic law does not suggest that the impact of 'urf has not been given 
attention in Islamic jurisprudence. My contention rather, is based on the fact 
that it has been assigned a less prominent status, than, for instance, ijmEl 
(i.e. the prinCiple of consensus). Here, I propose to show that whilst' urf is 
1 Ahmad Hassan, The Doctrine of lima' in Islam: A Study of the Juridical Principle of Consensus (New Delhi: 
Kitab Bhavan, 1992). 
2 To maintain consistency, I will in the context of this study use mainly the tenu 'Uif as implying custom. I am 
aware that at times most scholars use these tenus interchangeably. For a more detailed definition on 'Uif and 











normatively treated as an "auxiliary" or extra3 source of Islamic law, it does in 
fact feature prominently in the formulation of Islamic law. That is why for 
instance, a minority of scholars has ruled that it is a primary source of law, 
and it is this latter view that this dissertation supports and seeks to prove. 
This particular view has over a period of time become "buried" and hence its 
non-acceptance 4. 
The problem of denying 'Uff a legitimate or more prominent status as a 
source of Islamic law, not only gives currency to the notion that Islamic law is 
static, but effectively sanctions such a notion. Of course, conservative and 
apologetic Muslim scholarship refutes this notion, that is, the assumption that 
Islamic law is static. The thrust of such scholarship assumes that allowing 
'urfprominence as an independent source of law is tantamount to diluting and 
mutilating the divine nature of Islamic law, and thus undermining its 
"superhuman"s nature. This view is an over simplification of how Islamic law 
operates and functions. Furthermore, it undermines the impact of human 
agency and the social environment in the construction of Jaw. 
The view proposed in this study, is that although traditional scholarship 
has denied 'un primacy as a source of Islamic law, it is, nevertheless, in 
actual practice indirectly invoked as something else, other than 'uff. Put 
differently, it does resurface in a disguised form wearing the garb of another 
legal principle. For instance, through the principle of ijm'fi (consensus), 
3 See Farhat Ziadeh, " 'Uif and Law in Islam" in The World of Islam: Studies in honor of Philip K. Hitti edited 
by James Kritzek and R Bayly Winder (London: MacMillan & CO LTD, 1959), pp. 60-67. 
4 Ibid., p. 64. 
5 See Gideon Libson, "On The Development of Custom as a Source in Islamic Law", Islamic Law and Society, 










ma$lafJa (public welfare) or istil)san Uuristic preference), customary practices 
are introduced into the body of the law. In such a context, turf is rendered 
"dependent on another principle", rather than stand independently. The 
3 
problem is that legal scholars are cautious not to over step the set 'normative 
boundaries' of the tradition - which is the agreed upon hierarchy of primary 
sources (the Our'an, Sunnah, /jma' and Oiyas). Such scholarship is rather 
content with preserving the status quo, that is, the accepted hierarchy of 
sources. Given such a context, 'urf is then treated as a 'marginal category', 
and hence the title of this dissertation: 'Urf (custom) as a marginal discourse 
in the formulation of Islamic law: Myth or Reality. 
The above title, in a sense, informs the central thesis of this dissertation. 
The thesis postulated here is that contrary to the normative credo of Muslim 
legal theory that invokes 'urf as a source of law, only in the absence of a 
clear textual evidence or nass, 'urf or custom in practice permeates legal .. 
theory as its primary informant. Furthermore, I will show that the denial of 
giving primacy to custom as a source of law is based on an epistemology that 
is trapped in its past normative history. Part of such a normative history is 
that it is culture-specific, and here, I imply its Arabo-centric and patriarchal 
social milieu. Arguably, it is this social milieu that has mainly served as the 
social base from which Islamic law has evolved. 
Motivation 
Arguably the reason I have chosen to focus on 'urf, is due to the fact that this 
subject has not been sufficiently explored in most scholarly works on Islamic 










contemporary research on Islamic law and legal theory in particular, as 
asserted elsewhere, points out that "the evolution of the discipline and its 
sub- themes is still in its infancy"S and as such, my thesis is a contribution to 
this felt need. Therefore, furf as an underresearched "sub-theme" in Islamic 
law, provides a vantage point to further explore how Islamic law, as tradition, 
is constructed and formulated. 
In addition, whilst other juristic principles like istiIJsan Uuristic preference), 
/jma' (or consensus of jurists) or ma~/alJa (human welfare) are dealt with 
extensively in some works in English, the same cannot be said about 'Uff 
4 
For instance, during this research it became clear that there is an absence of 
substantial works deliberating on the principle of 'urf, at least in English. This 
factor alone appears to be sufficient motivation for selecting to focus on Ibn 
'Abidin's work on 'urf as a means of exposing it to a wider readership not well 
versed in Arabic texts. 
In mentioning the above factors, I do not wish to belittle the contributions 
of those who have written some articles or devoted chapters on furf in 
western languages. The point I am making, is that there is yet no substantial 
work in a single manuscript focusing exclusively on 'urf. Therefore, the 
different articles or chapters mentioned cannot be a substitute for a work that 
needs to be devoted entirely to turf. This further supports the motivation to 
choose this subject for enquiry. 
6 See Ebrahim Moosa's, "The Legal Philosophy of al- Ghazali: Law, Language and Theology in al- Mustasfa", 











As pointed out (see p.2), my main contention in this dissertation is that, 
whilst in theory, turf is accorded a marginal status, in practice it is frequently 
invoked by jurists to give credence to their postulations and legal rulings. 
In fact, from the formative, classical, medieval and modern periods, turf 
continued to playa prominent role, not only as a source, but also as 
contributing to the very growth of Islamic law, thereby displaying its 
"mutable,,7 nature. 
Viewed from the above context it can be contested that turf continues to 
playa more primary function in the formulation of Islamic law than jurists and 
legal theorists would admit. Unless we take cognisance of the point made by 
Coulson, that the "the bulk of Muslim legislative practise is jurist's law',8, a 
superfluous glimpse on the structure of Islamic law and how law functions 
within Muslim society can easily delude us. What is evident in Coulson's 
statement, is that jurists can easily manipulate the law. In other words, 
through skillful manipulation of the sources of Islamic law, it is easy for jurists 
to "pretend" that they are confining themselves to the normative and 
acceptable hierarchy of sources, thereby invoking the readily accepted and 
less problematic sources instead of the 'problematic' ones. Thus, in such a 
context jurists are content with satisfying what they deem as the objectives of 
7 See Khalid Masud's Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of al-Shapbi 's Life and Thought (Delhi: International 
Islamic Publishers, 1977), p. 16. 
8 See, for instance Noel Coulson quoted in Moosa's" 'The child belongs to the bed': illegitimacy and Islamic 
Law" in Questionable Issue: Illegitimacy in South Africa. Edited by Sandra Burman and Eleanor 










the law or maqa~id, rather than engage its epistemological foundations9 by 
dabbling with 'less acceptable' sources, such as 'urt. 
It is in the context of these juxtapositions by legal theorists and jurists on 
'urf, that is, assigning it a marginal role, that such a practice, rather than 
6 
advance Islamic law, regresses it. Given such a tendency, my argument here 
is that a fresh perspective on 'uti is deemed crucial as a point of departure or 
paradigm for reworking the epistemology of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Method, Methodological and Theoretical considerations 
This is a textual study based on a critical analysis of Ibn 'Abidfn's Majmu'at 
Rasa'i1lbn ~bjdih, focussing on the section on 'uti (Nahsr AI- 'Uti). The 
rationale for selecting this text is, first this treatise provides a case study 
where the problem of 'urf, as a source of Islamic law is approached. Second, 
Ibn 'Abidin's treatment of 'uti is widely acknowledged by many scholars of 
note as a brilliant discussion of the subject of 'utiwithin the classical 
context. 10 
9 Although in a slightly different context, the point about the agency of the jurists in detennining the law is well 
captured by Tayob where he shows how through the doctrine of taljiq reformist jurists would go against 
"traditional practise" and "follow the judgement of another school. .. as a means of overcoming legal 
problems". For a detailed discussion on this see Tayob's Islam: A Short Introduction (England: Oneworld 
Publications, 1999), p. 145. See also, Abdullahi An-Na'im's Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, 
Human Rights, and International Law (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 33. 
10 To my knowledge, besides two local translations (unpublished), the work of Ibn 'Abidm (d. 1836) has not as 











Methodological and theoretical considerations in this study are considered 
equally important for an understanding of turf (custom) and its implications as 
a theme of study. For, if turf serves as a pretext for engaging the Islamic 
tradition, a preliminary word about the context of this study, in relation to 
religious studies, is necessary. 
Arguably, in the study of religion there is no finality on a definite pattern 
for a methodological framework. Based on contemporary writings regarding 
methods towards the study of religion, the broad categories in which this can 
be located normatively are the historical, comparative, phenomenological and 
the so-called "insiders'" approach. If turf, in its "textual" connotation, assumes 
that this is a legal study anchored within the ambit of Islamic jurisprudence 
and legal theory, what is its relevance then to the study of religion? Put 
differently, what is the relationship between religious studies and law, and 
what are the possible methodological options open for engaging such an 
enquiry? 
In answering the above set of questions, first, let me declare that in the 
context of this study, the approach I adopt implies more than just engaging 
legal theory and Islamic jurisprudence. In other words, the approach adopted 
here goes beyond speculating on purely legal and Islamic law related 
theories - it is in a sense inter-disciplinary. Besides, I wi" also focus on the 
socio-historical and religio - cultural concerns underpinning the subject under 
investigation. That is why, for instance, a section of chapter One provides a 
synopsis on the development and structure of Islamic law. This helps, albeit 
in a limited manner, to place into perspective the historicity of Islamic law and 











Second, on situating this study within religious studies, the methodological 
questions around the study of religion will be considered. For example, this 
particular study is under the rubric of "self- understanding". Put differently, 
the perspective that permeates this study lies within the Islamic tradition 
itself. The study seeks to elucidate and interrogate the very foundations on 
which the Islamic tradition professes to be premised on. In particular, through 
the vantagepoint of 'urf the study attempts to self-critique what aspects 
exactly constitute sources of Islamic law? 
Of course, with the concern for self- understanding of the tradition, I am 
conscious of the pitfalls that normally underpin such an enquiry- namely 
"idiosyncrasy of personal experience" (which stems from close proximity or 
affinity with the studied tradition). The risk here is that scholarly and scientific 
concerns could easily "recede very much to the background,,11. In other 
words, the "enquiry" into the subject becomes over burdened with "pedantic 
questions, and thus fails to provide the required results". The required 
results in this case being a "rational", relatively "objective" and a critique free 
of dogma and conventional dictates that emanate from the studied tradition. 12 
Surely, it is extremely difficult to maintain a balance here. In other words, 
to straddle between the imperative to exhaustively engage and critically 
examine the tradition at the plane of self understanding, and yet, to do so 
simultaneously by employing other human and social science methodological 
tools "for purposes of edification,,13. Therefore, based on these comments, 
11 See John F. Wilson and Thomas P. Slaven, Research Guide to Religious Studies (Chicago: American Library 
Association, 1982), p. 13. 












my own approach here will cross boundaries and invoke general theories 
prevalent in social sciences to enlighten the discussion. This, it is hoped, will 
assist in steering the project away from the "idiosyncrasy", or "intensity" and 
subjectivity emanating from the trappings of the tradition's preoccupation with 
self-understanding. Naturally, this will give the method employed here the 
aura of "bipolarity or two dimensionality.,,14 By "bipolarity", in this context, I 
imply responding to methodological demands and yet remain critical and 
objective to the subject without sacrificing the empathy of an insider's 
perspective. 
In seeking to do a critical and historical examination of how the problem of 
'urf has generally been treated in Muslim scholarship, theoretically, I will, to 
some extent, draw from the theories of Edward Shills, Terrence Ranger, Eric 
Hobsbawm and Talal Asad. These theories as expounded by these scholars 
are useful insofar as they help to explore how traditions are handed down 
from one generation to the next, and how tradition functions as a "Iegitimising 
and delegitimising" factor in human affairs. Arguably, in the context of our 
study on 'urf, there is a sense in which we can say that it is through tradition 
that the status of turf has become compromised. In other words, in reading 
Islamic law as "tradition" we can easily see, as I will show, how such a 
tradition does contradict itself in its pronouncements on 'wf Therefore, given 
tl1is theoretical bias, in my attempt to show its relegation to a less prominent 
source of Islamic law, 'urfwill be mediated through the idiom of tradition. By 












First, is to attempt a comprehensive study of how religion as tradition 
invents and reinvents itself. Second, is to relate specifically to the problem of 
custom or 'urf and how its status, as source of Islamic law, is negotiated in 
Islamic jurisprudence. In this instance, the internal and specific questions 
relating to the tradition's self-understanding are examined. 
Chapter Outlines 
After the introduction, which introduces the subject of inquiry and lay the 
theoretical and methodological considerations underpinning this study, this 
dissertation comprises four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One 
provides a brief description on 'urf(custom) and how it has been dealt with in 
legal scholarship. It looks at the main themes and ideas that permeate its 
treatment by different scholars with an appraisal, evaluation and critique of 
their expositions. The aim here is to place the theme of custom in Islamic 
legal theory into perspective. 
Chapter Two focuses on Ibn 'Abidin, the juriconsult whose treatise on 'urf 
is central to this study, in that, it provides a case study based on a textual 
perspective on the problem of 'urfwithin Islamic legal theory. This chapter, 
also provides a biographical profile of Ibn 'Abidin, thus sketching the context 
and environment of his scholarship. This is followed by an analysis of Ibn 
'Abidin's discourse on 'urfwhich lays the foundation for chapter Three, where 
Ibn 'Abidin's discourse is used as an index for problematising the subject of 
'urf and its impact as a "formal" source of Islamic law. In order to situate Ibn 
'Abidin's discourse, I place it within a comparative perspective. This is done 











It is in this chapter and in the fourth, where the problem of the 
epistemological crisis within Muslim legal theory is probed. Also, it is in these 
chapters that the discussion on 'uti is more nuanced and problematised. In 
particular, my postulation on how its malleability as a potential instrument for 
inventing and reinventing the Islamic tradition forms the bulk of the 
discussion. 
Finally, the conclusion attempts to draw the different issues raised and 
places these within a contextual framework that draws the necessary 












Custom (' Uri) in Perspective 
12 
This chapter situates the subject of this study, that is, 'urf (custom), by placing 
it within a broad general perspective. I do so by first examining its treatment 
in scholarship by looking at both Muslim and non- Muslim scholars. This in a 
sense provides a literature survey on the treatment of custom, and sets the 
tone for the subsequent chapters. Second, as a preliminary note, a synopsis 
on the development and structure of Islamic law precedes the discussion on 
lurf. However, before doing so, key terms central to this study are first 
defined. These terms are 'custom' and 'tradition'. 
Defining the former, custom ('urt) is crucial, in that, it is the subject of 
investigation, whereas 'tradition', provides a methodological and theoretical 
framework for focusing the discussion. Seeking to establish a working 
definition of these terms helps to eliminate any ambiguities and confusion 











Defining turf (custom) 
Linguistically, 'urf is derived from the Arabic verb 'arata, meaning to know, to 
be aware, or to be acquainted with. It could, therefore, be summed up as 
what is commonly known and socially acceptable. In the context of legal 
discourse, it is the unwritten law of the community, the 'customary law' as 
distinct from the statute law. In the Islamic legal context, customary practice is 
seen as the antithesis of the shan-'a or legal canon of Islam. As this study will 
show, 'urfhas, in many instances, served as the very raison detre in the 
formulation of Islamic law. For instance, Libson underpins this assertion 
when he writes that: 
The refusal of Islamic law to grant custom status as a formal source 
is surprising on three counts. First, custom plays a vital role in almost 
every legal system as a source of law for the development of the legal 
practice, a bridge between legal theory and practise ... Second, the 
practice of the Muslim community was an influential factor in shaping 
legal norms and contributed to the development of Islamic law. That, 
this was the case may be discerned from references in tile classical 
literature to "popular" custom ... Third, assuming as held by some 
scholars, Roman law exerted influence on Islamic law, and further, 
that Jewish law and Islamic law had a mutual influence upon one 
another, one is struck by great difference between Roman and 











of law, and Islam does not. 15 
libson goes on to point out that, in spite of the non recognition of turf as "a 
source of law, most "Muslim jurists - in particular the ~anafis and even more 
so the Malikis- refer to it with great frequency".16 This constant reference to 
furf notwithstanding, its status still remains "controversial" - leading to what 
libson terms a "discrepancy between theory and practice,,17. I will elaborate 
more on this latter point in the following chapters. 
Second, building on what Libson states (acknowledging the status of turf 
"as a formal source"), this dissertation seeks to move beyond pleading for the 
legitimacy of turf as a "formal source", to actually affirm its status as a primary 
source. As indicated, this will be done in chapters Two and Three (see p.9), 
where my hypothesis is tested by exploring and analysing Ibn 'Abidin's work 
on turf. 
Defining Tradition 
The second term to be clarified is "tradition". Since the term tradition features 
prominently in our discussion on 'urf (custom), it is also necessary that such a 
term is defined. In the context of this study, tradition is used as a theoretical 
tool, in that, it is used in the context of defining religion generally and more 
specifically the "Islamic tradition". Certainly, "tradition" is a tension-loaded 
term with "multiple meanings".18 The purpose here is not to explore all of 
15 Libson, 1997, pp. 135- 136. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 











these meanings, but attempt a working definition for the purpose of this 
dissertation. 
According to Edward Shills in his extensive work on Tradition, amongst 
other definitions, tradition simply means what "is transmitted or handed down 
from past to present '" viewed in this context tradition then does not define 
the parameters that constitutes it..." In other words, tradition is open to new 
interpretations or readings. Put differently, it is not a closed book but open-
ended. Shills explains this further when he asserts that tradition "makes no 
statement about what is handed down ... it says nothing about how long it has 
been handed down or in what manner, whether orally or in written form". 19 
What is apparent in Shills' definition of tradition is that it is fluid and open to 
new interpretations. This is in sharp contrast to the often-held notion of 
tradition as something fixed or static. It is perhaps useful at this point to 
contrast Shills' reflections on tradition with those of Hobsbawm. 
First, Hobsbawm seems to distinguish "tradition" from "custom"(p.2). 
"Tradition", argues Hobsbawm, "must be distinguished from 'custom"', in that, 
what sets a tradition apart from custom is that "the characteristics of 
'traditions' ... is invariance".2o In other words, one of the hallmarks of tradition 
is that "it imposes fixed (normally formalised) practises such as repetitions", 
whereas, "custom" is marked by its capacity to "appear compatible or even 
identical with precedent. .. (And) social continuity". 
19 Shills, p.12. 
20 See Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction" in The Invention of Tradition edited by Terrence Ranger and Eric 











What this distinction entails is that custom, as the 'natural law' of the 
community has to be variant. If it were to be "invariant" like tradition, it would 
run against the natural order of things or against the social make-up of the 
society whose ethos is marked by variations. So, if in this foregoing 
definition, tradition as opposed to custom is marked by the tendency to be 
"invariant", it must, nevertheless, still continue its repetitions or has to 
"reinvent" itself,21 
It is in the context of these repetitions (or inventions), that I want to argue, 
that the differentiation is not as wide as Hobsbawm makes it to be, but a 
subtle one. It is in the context of this blurred division that "custom" could be 
metaphorically read as "tradition". For as Hobsbawm points out, that through 
the ritualisation that takes place through custom, "traditions" are invented or 
their repetition is actualised. What is discernible in this statement is a 
symbiotic relationship between "custom" and "tradition", 
To avoid a lengthy definition of a tension-loaded term such as tradition (a 
term that has compelled Shills to write an entire manuscript), I settle for this 
definition: tradition is not a static category but is fluid and capable of 
subjecting itself to 'new readings' and 'interpretations'. In short, it is 
malleable. It is this perspective that will inform my working definition of 
"tradition". Accordingly, such a definition is also extended to view 'urt 
(custom) in the same light. In other words, 'urtinvoked in the idiom of 
tradition, implies a dynamiC and fluid concept that is an agency for legal 
formulation. This is in sharp contrast to the hitherto fossilised and rigid view 











of custom- a view trapped by an epistemological paradigm that negates the 
independence of custom as a formal source of law. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the problematic nature of the term 
"tradition", in our context, "tradition" in its general usage refers to Islam, the 
religion as taught by Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, moving from this 
premise, we will then talk of the "Islamic tradition". Generally, in the popular 
sense, the notion of "Islamic tradition" connotes Islam and its various 
institutions. However, for this study, "Islamic tradition" is too broad a 
category - it needs to be narrowed down. In other words, to speak in the 
generic term about the "Islamic tradition" is problematic or at best "confusing". 
For instance, what is implied by "Islamic tradition"? 
Riffat Hassan in her attempt to answer this very pressing question 
observes that Islam "like other major religious traditions- does not consist of, 
or derive from, a single source."22 The implication here is clear, and that is, 
Islam has many sources. Put differently, Islam is not monolithic but multi -
dimensional. For example, could it be that this "tradition" simply implies the 
Qur'anic text, or the prophetic practice (Sunnah) and Ah§dith (prophet's 
transmitted sayings)? Or could this tradition imply fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 
and the distinctive madhahib (schools of law)? Arguably, as Singular "texts" 
all of these "traditions" carry their own 'source -centred interpretation' of 
Islam, as Muslim scholarship itself would show. Take, for instance, the 
legalists' and scripturalists' discourses, particularly as manifested in $ufism 
or mysticism. If you take the latter, it is clear that its discourse (Le. $iifism) is 
22 Riffat Hassan, "Muslim Women and Post-Patriarchal Islam;' in After Patriarchy, edited by Paula M.Cooey, 











located within an esoteric and mystical dimension, and hence the presence of 
a tradition called "$Gfi tradition in Islam". Given this plurality of sources, what 
then is the Islamic tradition -- and which one is the authoritative or the higher 
in this hierarchy? In offering an answer, on this question, Riffat Hassan 
arbitrarily provides a hierarchy of what constitutes the Islamic tradition. For 
example, she states that "insofar as Islam is understood theoretically or 
normatively -- the two most important sources are the Qur'an, (Muslim divine 
scripture as revealed to Muhammad) and the Hadith (prophetic sayings .... ".23 
Of course, it is not my intention here to delve into the problematic of these 
constituent sources as they are placed in this hierarchy. As already 
mentioned, my concern here is to show that it will be irresponsible to invoke 
"Islamic tradition" as if it were a unitary and monolithic entity. 
'Urf (custom) as Tradition 
With this conceptual clarity on what is "tradition", and what constitutes the 
"Islamic tradition" in particular, it is now easier to introduce and situate our 
theme of investigation, that is, 'uti through the idiom of tradition within the 
context of Islamic law (read as tradition). 
Now, if law is designated as symbolic of tradition, and in this case Islamic 
law, surely as "tradition" it is not "wholly free from ambiguity, obscurity, and 
23 RifIat Hassan, p.39. For a detailed discussion see also the work of Daniel Brown, Rethinking Tradition in 











uncertainty".24 Arguably, it is this "ambiguity" that makes law and in this case 
Islamic law susceptible to clarification. In the case of Islamic law, its 
"ambiguity" is more pronounced when one examines what constitutes its 
sources? To be specific, this is more evident in the investigation of 'urf or 
custom as a source of Islamic law. Therefore, problematising 'urf as a 
marginal source of Islamic law, amongst other things, seeks to further expose 
the "epistemological crisis",25 confronting Islamic legal theory. 
It is my assertion that most works on Islamic law have tended to be 
theoretical and descriptive without sufficiently engaging and critically 
analysing the problem of epistemology within Islamic legal thought. Arguably, 
even works that attempt to engage the problem of this crisis (the 
epistemological), are marked by a conservatism that is too cautious not to 
unsettle the "normative paradigm" upon which Islamic legal theory and law is 
based. This tendency is discernible in most works dealing with Islamic law. 
For example, Hallaq makes reference to the highly acclaimed 14th century 
scholar, ShatibT. As if puzzled, Hallaq observes, that "Even ShatibTcould not . . 
free himself ... from the literal grip of the hermeneutic that so thoroughly 
permeated Muslim juristic thinking".26 Explaining this further, he notes that it 
was (and still is) "sufficiently right to marginalize completely, if not silence, 
any hermeneutic that attempted a change or restatement of the law." In other 
24 Shills, Tradition, p. 96 
25 Here I am using a phrase employed by Prof. ASachedina where he explains and puts into perspective the 
problem of an epistemology that tends to be misogynist due to its patriarchal social base, See Abdul Aziz 
Sachedina's "Woman, Half-the-Man? Crisis of Male Epistemology", unpublished paper. I have nevertheless 
deployed this term to connote my own argument that problematises the structural hierarchy in what constitutes 
sources ofIslarnic law. 
26 See Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni U!Ul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: 











words, any departure from the normative legal formulation and interpretations 
of Islamic law are immediately frowned upon. Hallaq, in his recent work has 
identified this tendency as the "literal grip of the classical hermeneutic".27 As 
noted, this "classical grip" continues to permeate most works of modern and 
contemporary scholars. For instance, this tendency is again observable in a 
recent work by Moosagie, whose central thesis is to demonstrate the capacity 
of Islamic law's ability to meet "social exigencies" - and therefore capable of 
adapting to social change.28 'Urf, in the context of Moosagie's discourse, is 
invoked to demonstrate his central thesis that law in Islam can be extended 
and naturally has the propensity to accept change. This, he argues, is 
through "the vital role of extra-legal propositions and their crucial function in 
the judicial process". To support this argument, he unequivocally states that" 
a ruling that fails to take proper account of its social milieu is ... devoid of any 
judicial insight". 29 
I am not so much concerned with the latter's preoccupation with the 
"adaptability" of Islamic law but rather wish to show the inherent 
contradictions in this type of work. In particular, Moosagie's approach serves 
as a good model of similar works characterised by apologetics based on the 
imperative to show "adaptability" of Islamic law. What is interesting to note, is 
27lbid. 
28 This particular work is relevant here in that the writer has devoted a complete section on custom (' urJ) or what 
he terms "prevailing norms" to bolster his thesis. See Alie Moosagie's, "Islamic law and social change", MA 
Thesis, university of Cape Town, 1989. 











that whilst this work is daring in its attempt to illustrate the capacity of Islamic 
law to meet social challenges, it is equally trapped by "the literal grip of the 
hermeneutic"(see p. 19). The writer, for instance, is quick to register his 
concern about how the results of "meeting the challenge of adaptability" can 
still leave Islamic law adulterated by the imperative to meet change. For 
example, he asks whether in the pursuit of extending itself to accommodate 
change, is it possible for Islamic law not to "sacrifice any of its authenticity at 
the altar of change"? What is clearly discernible in this last statement is an 
apprehension or fear that the "authenticity" of Islamic law may be lost. 
Accordingly, this line of reasoning confines "authenticity" only to the "classical 
hermeneutic". The logical conclusion from the thrust of such a perspective is 
that all other readings of Islamic law are less "authentic" since they have the 
potential to "adulterate" the law. 
In citing the above example, my point is simply to show how works written 
along similar lines, despite the pretence of showing the "mutable" nature of 
Islamic law, they do not move beyond this point. The problem is that this 
tendency does not stretch the boundaries of Islamic jurisprudence any better 
than the classical scholars have done. In fact, it could be argued that the 
classical scholars were more daring in their scholarship, for they opened new 
frontiers than their present day counterparts. 
The question begging an answer is if Islamic law was a synthesis of the 
text and its immediate social environment, what then stops custom from being 
a primary source of law? Why is there such a difficulty in accepting its 











However, before dealing directly with the question of 'urf, it is proper that 
first, I provide a brief account on the development of Islamic law. Within this 
account a synopsis of the normative structure of Islamic law will be 
presented. This background is necessary, it provides a framework for 
contextualising the status and place of 'urf in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Development and Structure of Islamic law: A Synopsis 
This is not a detailed discussion, already, there are many works dealing with 
this subject, that is, development and structure of Islamic law.30 To start with, I 
affirm that to assume Islamic law is static and monolithic is a gross error. It 
has, over the ages, undergone noticeable changes. Innovation and creativity 
is clearly discernible in the early formative periods in the development of 
Islamic law, particularly the first three centuries. These periods can be 
divided into two distinguishable periods in the development of Islamic law. 
These are the prophetic and post prophetic periods. 
The Prophetic period is the era in which Muhammad was alive and 
received revelation. During this period, according to Islamic history, 
Muhammad was the ruler, the judge and law giver.31 Islamic law within this 
context, emanated as a synthesis of Muhammad's intervention in the daily 
disputes of his immediate society rather than as a code or text imposed from 
the outside. What this implies, is that Qur'anic revelation was not arbitrarily 
30 See, for example Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 17 
31 See also R. Stephen Humphrey, Islamic History: A Framework/or Inquiry (London: LB. Taurus & Co Ltd., 











imposed on Arab society, but was mediated by the Prophet, taking into 
account the prevalent social norms and customs. In this context, these norms 
and customs were not invoked in the sense of being "an extra source of law" 
as legal scholarship claimed later, but served as a primary source of law. 
In other words, whilst lVIuhammad was the lawgiver, he did not ignore Arab 
customary practice, but sought to incorporate it. The purpose of law in such 
a context was not so much a concern about bringing in a new blue print, but 
to provide a mechanism for social cohesion without upsetting the existing 
status quo in Arab society. 
It will be true to say that whilst the Qur'anic guidelines sought to sanction or 
discredit some of the prevailing customs, the framework of early Islamic 
law was essentially a product of familiar Arab concepts32. A classical 
example is the concept of sunna (a precedent or normative custom). 
According to Schacht, Arabs "were and are, bound by tradition and 
precedent. Whatever was customary was right and proper,,33. That the 
concept of sunna became, according to Islamic legal theory or fiqh, regarded 
as the second most important source of Islamic law, underlies its centrality in 
Islamic law. 
However, it is worth noting, that whilst the sunna has become the 
embodiment of Islamic law, Schacht observes that in its original context, it 
was used as a political ploy to sanction the political administration and 
poliCies of "the first two caliphs"(Abubakr and Umar). The point here is that it 
was not used as a "legal precept" but as a political tool. According to 
32 Schacht, p.l? 











Schacht, sunna in this context provided a doctrinal link, linking the practice or 
rule of Abubakr and Umar with that of the Qur'an. Whilst not dismissing 
Schacht's notion, that the concept of sunna was used for political ends rather 
than legal purposes, I find his analysis a bit problematic. 
First, it seems unmindful of the fact that Islamic law is not only rooted in 
the "social ideals ... but also . .. in the social reality,,34 (italics mine). In 
other words, the social ideal is as expressed in the Qur'anic revelation and 
the practice of the prophet, whereas the social reality is manifested in the 
societal practices of Arabia or Arab custom. The prophet as well as his 
Successors, responded to this social reality by applying the text to the social 
environment. 
Now if the modus operandi was to incorporate existing concepts already in 
vogue amongst the Arabs (or the sunnah of the Arabs), this does not in any 
way diminish their legal status or relevance as legal precepts as appropriated 
by Islamic usage. What is crucial to note here, is that sunnah as Arab 
custom or "urt' was relied upon as a primary source for legal formulation. 
Schacht's misgivings seem to underrate the genius of the early caliphs' 
innovative measures to apply Islamic law. It appears that these early 
lawgivers were acutely aware of the need to take the existing social 
conditions and trends as crucial building blocks for applying the divine text. 











Another distinct period in which developments in early Islamic law is 
manifest, is during the post-prophetic period, particularly the era in which the 
early schools developed. This era is historically characterised by the Iraq 
and Hijazi schools of Islamic law, or what became known as "the ancient 
schools".35 Whereas in the earlier periods there were no formal legal schools 
per se, except that, the Prophet, and later his companions, played the 
commentary role as immediate interpreters of the law- in other words, the law 
emanated from their interventions in giving rulings. In the period under 
discussion, formal legal schools began to emerge. Private individuals who 
became the living tradition of the school headed these schools. Islamic law, 
as seen from these schools during this period, was both "retrospective" and 
"synchronous", to use Schacht's terminology. By retrospective, it is meant 
that the law was based on a " 'well established precedent (or sunna 
madiya)',,36. This established practice then reflected the actual practice of the 
community or customs of the community. It was this concept that later 
distinguished the school of Malik, the Madinan jurist, in that, the guiding 
principle in his legal theory was the concept of 'amal of the practice or actions 
of the people of Madina.37 
The synchronous aspect became manifested in the notion that "it is only 
the opinion of the majority that counts". According to this notion, the views of 
the minority were not taken seriously or did not count at all. What mattered 
was the consensus of the majority of scholars. The period in which this trend 
35 Schacht, p. 5. For a more detailed account on the emergence of early Sunni schools oflaw, see Christopher 
Melchert, The Formation of the SunnrSchools of law: 9th 10'h Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
36 Schacht, p. 5. 










found its expression is of importance, for it marked some of the shifts in the 
development of Islamic law. It was during the Umayyad period that a 
religious class known as the r Ulama or learned scholars emerged. 
26 
It was the consensus of these learned scholars that was regarded as binding 
on all Muslims. This was also the period of conquest, an era in which "power 
and wealth" had gained ascendancy, and not Islamic commitment and 
ideals,,38. The concern to uphold the ijma' or consensus of the scholars can 
perhaps be viewed from this background (Le. the perceived decadence that 
was setting in), and the ijma' can be seen as a mechanism to safeguard the 
community from further disintegration. With the growth of the Islamic Empire, 
the Muslim community ceased from being a homogenous culture but became 
a multi- cultural entity. This development did not leave Islamic law untouched; 
foreign practices and customs began to make their imprints felt. The end 
result was a gradual shift from the early practices of the prophet and the early 
community. This then meant that Islamic law started to incorporate more 
doctrinal sources in addition to established ones, that is, the Qur'an and 
Sunna. Given this context, concepts such as qiyas (analogical deductions) 
and ijma' (general consensus) gained currency. It was not until after the 
demise of Umayyad's rule, when the Abbasids gained power and political 
ascendancy, that the real systematic formulation of the legal doctrines began 
to take shape. 











First, it was Malik (d. 795) and Abu ~anifa (d. 767) who commenced to 
initiate their respective schools. AbO l:ianifa represented the school of Kufa, 
which was characterised by its reliance on human reason, or ra'iy, in 
formulation of doctrines. Malik, on the other hand, represented the Madinan 
School, with its emphasis on traditions, particularly as manifested in the 
actions, or 'amal of the people of Madina. 
The different orientations in these two schools mentioned obviously have 
their foundations in the history of their times or the context from where they 
emerged. In particular, the social conditions or environment played a central 
role in influencing these jurists. It is asserted that Abu Ijanifa was largely 
influenced by the cosmopolitan environment of Kufa, in which "Persian laws 
and civilisation" were more tolerant to the liberal use of human or personal 
reasoning. The Madinans on the contrary, were less tolerant, and 
scrupulously held that every law must be derived from the 'Qur/an and the 
Prophet's Sunna. 
Given these two extreme positions, that is, tradition and reason, AI -Shafi'i 
(d.819) emerged, and is credited with finding the desired compromise. AI-
Shafi'j ruled that "whenever the Qur/an and Sunna of the prophet failed to 
provide the jurist with explicit instructions or solutions, a similar or parallel 
case, for which there was a solution, could be substituted".39 This is what has 
been referred to as analogical deduction or qiyas. Given this background, a 
third source of Islamic jurisprudence developed. 











After qiyas, a fourth source of Islamic law, known as ijma' or consensus of 
the scholars developed. Credit for the development of this source is given to 
Malik. Originally it was exclusive, and confined to the consensus of the 
scholars of Madina only. Later, however, taking into consideration that the 
Islamic Empire had grown, it became inclusive of all the scholars of different 
regions. The Ummayyad era was then followed by the Abbasid period. The 
Abbasid era in particular distinguished itself as the period in which concern 
with the idea of making Islamic law, official law of the government, set in. 
Schacht writes that "in order to differentiate themselves and their revolution ... 
(the Abbasids) proclaimed their programme of establishing the rule of God on 
earth"40. Given this context, Islamic law as taught by the scholars was 
recognised as the "only legitimate norm". 41 This development clearly marks 
the secularising of earthly authority by invoking 'divine law' as a means of 
legitimisation. 
In short then, given the periods discussed here, two trends are 
observable. First, in the earlier periods, that is, starting with the prophetic era 
and that of Prophet Muhammad's immediate companions, it is discernible that 
rules were developed as informed by the existing practice of the community. 
Put differently, the practice of the community preceded theory -- custom was 
the primary locus for law formulation. However, in later periods, scholars had 
first to have recourse to the existing body or data of learning before they 
could pass rulings in the process of law formulation. This practise later gave 
grounds for blind imitation and following, or taqlid. It was against the dangers 
<Ill Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p. 49. 











of this blind imitation, that later in the eighteenth century, there emerged a 
modernist trend calling for a return to the early practise of ijtihad or critical 
reasoning and scholarly exhaustion in attempts to interpret the law. 
Sources of Islamic law 
The normative presentation of what constitutes sources of Islamic law is to 
commonly divide these into primary and secondary or subsidiary sources. 
Within this hierarchy the Qur/an and the Sunnah are its commentary through 
prophet Muhammad's words and deeds -- these are regarded as the primary 
sources. These primary sources are then followed by ijma' (consensus) and 
qiyas (analogy). In addition to these there are other principles that are less 
pronounced or regarded as problematic or minor sources, these are namely 
ma~/alJa (public welfare), istifJsan Uuristic preference), and 'urf (custom). As 
pointed out in my introduction (see pp. 1-3), 'urfarguably as it will be shown, 
remains amongst the highly contested principles. In other words, its status as 
a source of Islamic law is questionable worse when the proposition is that it is 
a primary source of Islamic law. According to the dominant view' urf cannot 
stand independently as a primary source of Islamic law especially when "it 
contravenes the na~9 (text) or what Kamali has called, "the definitive 
principles of the law".42 In this regard, all the SunnT schools of law are in 
agreement. For example, the ~anafi and Maliki schools support the view that 
'urf can be "recognised within limits" whilst the ShafiT school totally rejects 
this.43 Designating it as a primary source is regarded as violating the very 
42 See Kamali, p. 359. 











basis of Islamic law and uprooting its epistemological foundations. In other 
words, it is viewed as challenging the "supremacy of na§~", that is, the text of 
the Qur'an and Sunnah (Prophetic traditions). 
The fact that this hierarchization of the sources of Islamic law has been 
the work of jurists (see pA) and legal theorists is usually ignored. The 
problem is that this normative and presumably accepted "hierarchy of 
sources", promotes the idea that Islamic law, by its very nature, is stagnant 
and incapable of adapting to a changing environment. This naturally leads to 
the question of whether Islamic law as "tradition" is fossilised or not. Of 
course, I am saying this fully aware of the apologists' counter arguments 
offered by some Muslim legal scholars (see p.19) who argue that it is not. 
Based on these uncertainties, it is my strong assertion, that interrogating and 
challenging 'urfin its normative designation as a secondary source of Islamic 
law, helps us to appreciate and thus grapple better with the notion of 
changing or fixed "traditions." As indicated, that the hierarchy regarding 
sources of Islamic law, as presented in Islamic legal scholarship, is one of an 
absolute and unchanging tradition. However, as I will attempt to show in this 
work, that a thorough scrutiny of Islamic legal history conveys the opposite. 
In other words, what has come down from past generations of scholars as 
being the standard norm, is itself an end product of a constantly negotiated 
and mediated tradition. It has, in a sense, undergone different reincarnations. 
Except for a few, the problem with Muslim scholarship is the denial of 
these reincarnations or inventions of the tradition. Thus, in the context of this 
study, examining the status of 'urf as a source of Islamic law helps in 










the Islamic tradition willing to accept change? Or, to what extent does it 
reinvent itself to meet new challenges in a constantly changing social 
environment. 
What follows is a brief description of how the problem of 'uri has been 
negotiated within both the western and traditional paradigms dealing with 
Islamic legal theory. 
'Url (Custom) as a subject of inquiry in Scholarship: A Survey 
31 
A significant number of scholars, both Muslim and non- Muslim Scholars 
(Western) on Islam have written significantly on 'uri (custom) and its status in 
Islamic law. The problem, however, with these works is that they have 
treated the subject in a very descriptive manner, with a serious lack in 
analytical probing. This section examines some of these works with the aim 
of providing preliminary remarks on issues of theory and method in their 
treatment of the subject. 
I have selected a few authors to illustrate my case. By selecting these, 
the aim is to provide a sample on the different themes, approaches and key 
ideas adopted by these scholars as a way of placing the present study into 
perspective. The selection includes perspectives by scholars anchored in 
both "western scholarship" as well those who treat the subject from the point 
of view of Muslim tradition or as "Muslim" scholars. 
Farhat Ziadeh has written a useful treatise on " 'Uri and law in Islam,,44 
where, first, he provides a useful introduction by giving a detailed 











analysis on the "semantic progression" of the term 'urf. This is followed by a 
contextual presentation of how the term has been treated from the Qur'anic 
perspective. Ziadeh, to illustrate legitimacy of 'urf, draws extensively on the 
discourses of prominent and classical Muslim exegetes, like al-Tabari (d.922) 
and their pronouncements on 'urf. After this, he follows with a brief 
discussion of classical, medieval to as late as seventeenth and eighteenth 
century Muslim juriconsults' positions on 'urf in their respective discourses. 
These scholars range from AbO- Vusuf (d.798), Abu- Hanifa (d. 767) and al-
Shayb~ni (d. 804). The issue of contention amongst these classical scholars 
seems to have been whether "a new custom should be preferred to a text 
based on an old custom,,45 or not. 
Whereas AbO- tlanifa and AI- Shaybani (d.805) insisted on the text, on the 
contrary Abu- Vusuf (d.797) said that the custom was acceptable. Ziadeh 
credits Ibn 'Abidfn (d. 1836) for dealing with "this problem extensively,,46 in the 
treatise, Nashr al-'ati fi bina'i Ba'da '1- Af)kam 'alaI 'urf {disseminating the 
essence in the formulation of legal rules based on normative practises or 
customs).47 Another informative writing on 'urf is found in the work of Kamali 
(cited in the preceding discussions) on his section dealing with 'Uti. 
Arguably, Kamali's treatment of 'urf is very similar to Ziadeh's approach. 
For example, he devotes adequate attention to show the relevance of 'urf as 
traced from Qur'anic sources. Writing from this context he enhances his 
argument by using the Qur/an as a scale through which 'urf is mediated and 
4S Ziadeh, pp. 65-66. 
46 Ibid., p. 65. 












subsequently justified. For instance, he writes that" 'urf and its derivative, 
rna'riif occur in the Qur/an and it is the latter of the two which occurs more 
frequently". He then elaborates that from the Qur'anic perspective, rna'rut 
implies the known and this is "equated with good" whereas, "its opposite, the 
rnunkaror strange, is equated with evil". Basing his argument on what 
Qur'anic commentators have ruled on 'urf or rna'rOt, Kamali then draws the 
conclusion that turf in its Qur'anic sense does not have legal implications 
because it only relates to the discourse of piety. Notwithstanding his 
conclusion, in trying to show the relevancy of 'urf as a legal source, Kamal; 
does at least concede by subscribing to the "normative" view. Such a 
normative view holds that as long as 'urf"does not contravene shafi'a," it can 
be "rehabilitated" as a secondary source.48 
Coulson's article, on "Muslim Custom,,49 is another exciting work on 'urfin 
Islamic law. In particular, Coulson provides useful examples displaying the 
context in which' urf has been invoked as a source of law despite its hereto 
non acceptance as a prinCipal source. The author provides relevant 
historical instances where he shows brilliantly how 'urf, especially during the 
formative, classical and modern periods, was directly invoked as a source of 
Islamic law. In a very comprehensive fashion, Coulson provides examples 
from different centres of the Muslim world to illustrate his point. In the 
formative period, for instance, he cites examples from Madina and Kufa were 
the role of custom was central in the formation of law. For example, in the 
48 Kamali, pp. 359-376. 
49 Noel J Coulson, "Muslim Custom and Case Law" in Islamic Law and Legal Theory (New York: New York 











context of these two instances, Coulson states two contrasting views on the 
issue of women's contract in marriage. Whereas in Kufa, for instance, Abu 
l:Ianifa (d.767) ruled that an adult woman can "contract" herself in marriage; 
in Madina, for Malik (d.79S), the opposite held true, that "women must always 
be contracted in marriage". What is crucial to note about in this case is not 
so much the validity of either position (that is, Abu t:lanifa or Maliki's view), 
but rather to show that both positions were informed by and were" based on 
local practise,,50. For instance, as Coulson observes, Malik's view reflected 
the "traditional notion of marriage in the patriarchal tribal society of Madina" 
which was the domain of the Maliki School. On the contrary, Abu Hanifa's 
view reflected the social reality of Kufa with its "more cosmopolitan society" 
that accorded a "freer status" to women (the latter being the home to the 
J:lanafi school). 51 
To illustrate the above point, Coulson provides other examples regarding 
the application of Islamic law from different African and Asian contexts. In 
particular, he highlights how custom ('uti) is constantly invoked to shape and 
influence the shari'a. For example, he writes, "throughout almost the whole of 
Muslim Africa ... matters of land tenure are regulated by customary rules or 
practises".52 This he compares with similar cases in the Indian subcontinent, 
where he mentions a special act called the "shari'at act of 1937" which was 
imposed upon certain Muslim communities previously governed by custom, 
where issues relating to "agricultural land" were excluded from such act. In 
50 Coruson, p. 261. 
51 Coulson, p. 260. 











other words, the shar7'a in this context is subdued by existing customary 
practices on land. Whilst Coulson is credited for the number of practical 
examples he has shown, what is crucial to note is that all of this empirical 
evidence is shown to bolster the comparative project or bias in his study of 
Islamic law. As Coulson sums up, the usefulness of his project seems to be 
underpinned by a concern to show the "comparative lawyer" the "rich variety 
of stimuli, both indigenous and foreign ... - that provides such a wealth of 
fascinating material". 53 
Coulson's approach to some extent also permeates in the recent work by 
Gideon Libson promptly titled, "On the Development of Custom as a source of 
Law in Islamic Law"54. Perhaps the single most useful aspect about Libson's 
work is how he meticulously shows through a historical account how' urf has 
gradually shifted from a non-recognised source to a recognised one, albeit 
reluctantly. In particular, Libson shows that despite its non-recognition, 
classical jurists forced by "constraints imposed by practise, particularly in the 
economic sphere" were finally compelled to invoke custom as a legal 
principle. However, this recognition came through indirectly, that is, via other 
legal "devices"(see p.2). Accordingly, Libson credits these "various devices" 
for assisting to move 'urf"from the periphery of legal theory to become a 
focus of legal attention in the post-classical period".55 
53 Ibid., p. 267. 
54 See Gideon Libson, "On the Development of Custom as a Source in Islamic Law", Islamic Law and Society, 4, 
2,1997. 











Another work of interest is that of Zuhair E. Jwaideh's, "Developments in 
Islamic law and its influence on African law". 56 This work in approach roughly 
follows the model of Coulson and Libson -- it adopts the historical, descriptive 
and comparative perspective in treating the subject of custom. Of course, the 
point of departure in Jwaideh's case is that Islamic law is treated in its 
relation to African legal systems. This latter context provides a framework 
through which 'urf is investigated. Since most of the points in Jwaideh's work 
are somewhat covered in the works already mentioned, I will not dwell much 
on him. 
The next work of importance on 'urf, is in Subhi Mahmassani's seminal 
manuscript on Islamic jurisprudence57 under the section dealing with "the 
extraneous sources of law". Whilst Mahmassani's treatment of 'urfis 
somewhat more nuanced, nevertheless, it does so within boundaries imposed 
by normative Islamic jurisprudence. And that is, the status of 'urf as a source 
of law is mediated in the context of an "extraneous source of law". 
Characteristic of the discourse on normative Islamic jurisprudence, classical 
authorities are invoked to make a case for' urf as a dependable source. For 
example, this line of reasoning is clear when this renowned Muslim jurist 
writes: 
In any case the customs we have in mind and which are regarded 
as an extraneous source of law are those which conform to the 
established legal sources. The customs which are in conflict with 
these sources, or are in opposition to the spirit of the shari'8, are 
so Zuhair Jwaideh, "Developments ofIslamic Law and its influence on African Law", 1967. 











unequivocally rejected by the shafi'a. 58 
After the above-mentioned statement Mahmassani then cites examples of 
such customs that may be rejected by the shari'a. Here, in quoting 
Mahmassani, the intention is not to dispute his pronouncements on 'urf, but to 
highlight the normative trend that prevails in juristic discourse on 'urf. Such a 
discourse as noted presents 'urf as a category subservient to the shar7'a and 
therefore, not its natural constituent component. 
A Conclusion 
At this juncture it is useful to put into perspective the trends observed in the 
sample of scholars examined thus far. As stated in reference to Libson's 
approach, is that all these scholarly works, whilst focusing on 'urf (custom), 
have, nonetheless, failed to penetrate and analyse the status of custom as a 
primary source of law. Put differently, they do not sufficiently account for the 
problem of ambiguity in the sources of Islamic law. Whilst they are useful in 
showing that 'urf (custom) is occasionally invoked in the context of an "extra 
source", they do not problematise the question of a fossilised epistemology in 
Islamic jurisprudence and its theoretical foundations. Theirs is a historical 
and highly descriptive account with the overriding aim of bolstering the 
argument that 'urfin Islamic law is only a secondary source of law. 
Accordingly, within this context, lurf or custom is surbodinate to shari/a. In 
other words, as long as it does not contradict the "shari/a", classical legal 











theory sanctions its acceptance. The point here is not to debunk the thrust of 
these works on 'urf, rather, it is to allude to the gap that needs to be filled in 
contemporary studies on Islamic law. That felt need is the imperative to fill 
'the gap' by engaging the very nature of how the hierarchies in what 
constitutes sources of Islamic law, have been constructed and then passed 
as the "unchangeable". 
Finally, to sum up, three trends are observable. First is the text centred 
approach. Here 'urf is evaluated and granted permissibility insofar as it is in 
tandem with textual authority of the shari'a. For example, as seen in Kamali's 
case and Farhat Ziadeh, the thrust of their narratives on 'urf is that as long as 
'urf does not contradict the textual sources, it is deemed acceptable. 
However, in this context 'urfis invoked only in the category "of customary law" 
as to be invoked as law to fill the gap caused by the canon's inability to relate 
to the challenge posed by the textual ambiguity of the privileged canon, in 
this case the shari'a. 
Second, is the historical and descriptive nature of these narratives. This, 
for instance, is discernible in the approaches of Coulson, Libson and 
Jwaideh. As noted in the opening of this section, the aim here was to discern 
the common points in these works. The relevance of such an exercise lies in 
its usefulness in so far as it helps to observe points of similarity and 
divergence, if any, in these different narratives on 'urf (custom). The third, is 
as shown throughout most of the discussion in this chapter, is that the 
problem of 'urf (custom) has been treated in Islamic jurisprudence, 
particularly within the context of the normative paradigm. The main 










position advanced by classical legal theory in the treatment of 'urf or 
"classical hermeneutic" (I will discuss the third point more in detail in later 
chapters). 
39 
To put the study in context, the next chapter examines the problem of 'urf 
through the discourse of a single jurist, Ibn 'Abidin. This in a sense provides 













'Uri (Custom) Through Ibn 'Abidin's Discourse 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I presented a general perspective on 'wi and its 
status within Islamic jurisprudence. In this chapter, I begin to examine more 
closely the problem of 'urf as a source of Islamic law. I do so by analysing 
the discourse of Ibn 'Abidin (d.1836) in his treatise "Nashr al- 'arf fi bina'i 
ba'da '/-ahkam 'a181- 'urf",59 especially as it relates to the status of custom. 
Therefore, the "discourse" of this jurist on 'urf, provides a case study on how 
custom is mediated in Islamic jurisprudence within the context of classical 
legal theory. 
Since this is not a biographical study per se, it must be noted, this chapter 
is not intended to offer a full biographical account as a means to comprehend 
Ibn 'Abidin, the jurist. On the contrary, the biographical sketch provided here, 
is only useful insofar as it helps to provide a contextual framework for Ibn 
'Abidin's discourse on 'urf. This biographical sketch is then followed by an 
examination and analysis of Ibn 'Abidin's discourse on 'urf. 
I must stress that in using the term "discourse", I take account of its "range 
of meanings", that is, regarding its usage.60 However, in the context of this 
59 See Ibn 'Abidin's "al-'Urf' in MajmiN;t Risa'jf Ibn 'Abidin (Beirut, 1978). 
60 See John Bowen, Muslims Through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (princeton: 











Chapter, I use "discourse" based on Fairclough's notion, that "discourse as a 
practise is not just about representing the world, but constitutes the world of 
meaning.,,61 Borrowing this understanding of discourse, I proceed to ask the 
question: how is the problem of 'wi mediated in the discourse of this jurist? 
For example, what are Ibn 'Abidin's pertinent views on custom and its status? 
Does he, for instance, depart from the conventional and classical 
understandings of 'urfwithin Islamic legal discourse or not? To what extent 
does he challenge or endorse the dominant status quo regarding 'urn In a 
sense, these questions indicate the line of inquiry I take in examining this 
jurist's position on 'urt. But first, as a background to the discussion, let me 
provide a brief biographical profile on Ibn 'Abidin. 62 
Ibn 'Abidin: A Brief Biographical Profile 
The author of Nashr al-'arffi bina'i bCacja 'l-afJkam 'alaI-turf, is a 
seventeenth/eighteenth century Ijanafischolar, who lived in Damascus 
(Oimashq). Although popularly known as Ibn 'Abidin, his full name is 
Muhammad Amin ibn 'Umar ibn 'Abd al- 'Aziz ibn Muhammad Salah ai-Din. 
He was born in 1738CE in Damascus where he spent most of his adult life. 
He finally passed away after a short illness in the year 1853CE. 
61 See Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, 1992, pp. 62-65. 
62 Here I am indebted for most of the biographical detail to the honours research done by Asma Ceres. 
See Ceres' "Translation and introduction of a section of Ibn 'Abidin' s Rasm aI-Mufti" unpublished 










Arguably, Ibn 'Abidin rates amongst some of the most under researched 
jurisconsults in Muslim legal scholarship. This observation does not imply 
negligence of Ibn 'Abidin's works - on the contrary, some of his writings, 
42 
especially his treatise on 'urf is often relied upon as representing a normative 
view on the subject, especially by scholars after Ibn 'Abidin's time. This in 
itself is an indication of the high regard attached to this treatise among 
Muslim legal scholars. However, although his works are often cited and 
studied, I still feel Ibn 'Abidin has not been studied enough. 
Of course, veneration of Ibn 'Abidin's treatise on 'Uff, does not suggest 
that other scholars before him did not pay attention to the concept of custom 
or 'urf in Islamic jurisprudence. Notably, 10th and 12th centuries scholars, 
like al-Sarakhsi (d.1 097), not only acknowledged the impact of turf on Islamic 
law but accorded it a status "on the same level as the Our'an".63 
Nevertheless, this view, as Libson has observed, has by and large remained 
a marginal one, if not "buried" in Islamic legal discourse.64 
In keeping with the old tradition of committing the Our/an to memory, Ibn 
'Abidin, under the tutelage of his father memorised the Our'an from an early 
age. As was customary of Ibn 'Abidin's time, he was not confined to only one 
discipline, but studied most of the Islamic disciplines in vogue. These 
disciplines were studied under a number of prominent scholars or shuyukh 
who were leading authorities on these subjects, especially in his 
region. For example, from Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id ibn Ibrahim al-Himyawi 
63 Libson, pp. 136- l37. 










(d. 1820CE), he studied and learnt Shafi'ijurisprudence, Arabic grammar, 
morphology and other Islamic sciences. 
43 
After successfully graduating from Himyawi, he was granted a certificate of 
competency or ijaza. This meant that the young scholar could now freely 
quote from his teacher and stand on his own. Ibn 'Abidin's next teacher was 
a contemporary scholar of his time, shaykh Shakir al- 'Aqid, alternatively 
known as Muqaddam Said. 
From Muqadam Said, Ibn 'Abidin studied Tarsir (Qur'anic exegesis), Hadith 
(Prophetic sayings), Mirath (Principles of inheritance), Ta$awwuf (Mysticism), 
Mathematics and Mantiq (logic). It is noted that it was while studying under 
this shaykh, (Muqadam Said) that he switched to the ~anaflschool of law. If 
on being a student of Muqadam S'ad, Ibn 'Abidln changed to the ~anafi 
school of law, this change seems to suggest that he must have followed a 
. different school, probably the Shafi'j school. This view seems to find support 
in the fact that his early studies in Islamic jurisprudence were mostly in Shafi'i 
jurisprudence (see p.42). This question is particularly relevant, especially if 
we are to make sense of Ibn 'Abidin's pronouncements on turf (I wi" take up 
this point later in the discussion). 
After settling in the t-:lanafr school, Ibn 'Abidin soon distinguished himself 
as an exceptionally intelligent student, launching his scholarly vocation from 
the early age of seventeen. From this early period, he wrote some of his 
popular works like al-BalJr al- Ra'iq and Radd a/-Mul)tar~/a Ourr a/- Mukhtar. 
Within a short span of time Ibn 'Abidin soon became a household name in 
Damascus. Suddenly, as a distinguished scholar, most of his works became 











scholarly reputation was his fatawa (juridical responsa) that became a point 
of reference for his contemporaries. Given the prominence attached to 
fatawa as a prominent genre in Islamic legal discourse, this was no mean 
achievement. For the fatwa as a legal document has the power not only to 
legitimise, or delegitimise, but also to sacrilize and desacrilize.65 If Ibn 
'Abidin's fatliw8 were recognised as a source of reference, it meant that his 
credentials as an authority on legal affairs were now firmly established. For 
instance, through the popularity of his tatawa, he earned the reputable 
position as secretary of verdicts. This was a clear indication that by now Ibn 
'Abidin's scholarly acumen and genius had matured and blossomed. 
Ibn 'Abidin's Works 
According to some records, Ibn 'Abidm is credited for writing about forty 
books. Nevertheless, the most recognised works that he authored, include 
the following: a/-Hashiya or Radd a/- MUl)tar 'ala Durr a/- Muhtar, Majmu'ah 
Rasa'i/ ibn 'Abidin, af'Uqud a/- Durriyyah ti Tanqih a/- FatawB a/-Hamidiyyah, 
Nuzhah a/- Nawa~ir 'ala a/- Ashbah wa a/- Nazair, Qurrah a/ 'Uyyun a/-
Akhyar. 
Ibn 'Abidin's Discourse on fUrl: Selected Themes and Analysis 
The treatise, Nashr a/- 'Art ti bina'i ba'qa ;> /- Af;1kam 'aI81- 'Urf, (a section from 
his Majmu'at Rasa'illbn 'AbidTn) is according to its author the best treatment 
65 For a detailed account on the significance ofJatawa in Muslim legal discourse see the work of 
Brinkley Messick, David S. Powers and Muhammad Khalid Masud, Eds., Islamic Legal 











the subject of custom in Islamic jurisprudence. In this section I begin by 
summarising the main points raised by Ibn 'Abidin's in the work under 
discussion. This I follow up by a critical analysis of Ibn 'Abidfn's discourse on 
the subject of 'urf. 
The text has four sections. The first, which can be classified as the 
introduction, offers a definition on the concept of 'urf. The second deals 
extensively with the theme of 'urfversus nass or textual evidence, that is, the .. 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. The third looks at I urf in its relation to Zahir a/-. 
Riwayah, that is, the main opinions of the I-:Ianafischool. The fourth section, 
the concluding part, discusses two important branches or rulings established 
on the strength or basis of 'urf as a legal principle. 
Defining custom ('urf): Ibn 'Abidin 
Ibn 'Abidin first defines' urf in general terms as " That which is derived from 
repetition through reiteration from time to time until it becomes known, firmly 
established in the heart and mind, deserving acceptability, until it becomes 
'urf".6s-ro render this more intelligible, Ibn 'Abidin's definition can be 
expressed by saying that 'urf"generally means that which a people or a 
section thereof have become accustomed to doing". 67 
Second, is a technical definition or marna istilahi. For example, the word 
~alah looses its literal meaning of supplication or dUB and embraces a shali 
or legal definition. In its sharror legal sense its definition connotes an 
institutionalised pillar of faith as well as involving several postures and 
66lbn 'Abidin, p. 2. 











movements. And so it is with sawm or fasting. In the literal sense sawm . . 
means to abstain. However, in its legal customary usage, as a pillar of faith, 
it means to abstain, amongst other things, from food, water, and sex, in the 
month of Ramadhan (the 9th month in the Muslim lunar calendar), from 
sunrise to sunset. From the example of these two words, we can see that 
some words have double meanings- a literal and a specialised or technical 
meaning. In other words, ~alah and ~awm employed in the context of the 
technical definition they immediately assume a "legal" (shar'i) or "textual" 
connotation. 68 Viewed within such a context, these words seize to have 
simple meaning but are associated in Muslim understandings with rituals of 
worship. In this specialised sense within Islamic law they then fall under what 
is regarded as fiqhul ibad§f or religious duties. 
Furthermore, Ibn 'Abidin also differentiates between what he terms 
practical'urf (i.e. 'urf al- 'a mal!) and verbal 'urf ('urf al- Qawli). According to 
the latter definition, and differentiation, for instance "the consumers of barley" 
or "raw mutton meat,,69 would constitute a practical I urf. Verbal' urf, on the 
contrary is determined by a regular use of a term, that is, referring to a 
"specific meaning which cannot be mistaken except to mean what it is 
intended for".70 One of the examples he cites here, is that of dirham or 
money. For instance, the term dirham in usage naturally implies a specific 
meaning that relates to the circulated currency of a particular country. 
68 Ibn 'Abidin, p. 2. 












After this general classification, 'urf is then narrowed down into two distinct 
categories. These are 'urf al-'am or the general 'urf, and 'urf af- kha~~ or 
specific 'urf. General 'urfimplies a widely accepted custom, whereas specific 
'urfis normally confined to local or regional understandings. 
To make sense of Ibn 'Abidin's typology of definitions on 'urfthe following 
must be observed: first, for the general 'urfto be acceptable, Ibn' Abidin 
argues, it must be consistent with the texf1. In other words, as long as it 
does not contradict the text or nass, it is acceptable. Accordingly, given this 
status, "urf here acts "as a limiting factor on the text". 72 In other words, the text 
is contextualised and placed within a social parameter. 
The above observation is substantiated by Ibn 'Abidin's view that even if 
'urfis "of general application since the days of the companions", it is 
immaterial. In other words, "whether old or new' urf' as long as it is general 
in the country" its legitimacy as a source for legal formulation is approved. 
Given this understanding then, Ibn 'Abidfn asserts that a general turf, has the 
propensity to sanction or discredit "rules formulated by former jurists". 73 
Now, if "rules formulated by former jurists" can be nullified on the basis of 
a general 'urf, the question then is, on what basis is this achieved? Arguably, 
this view is premised on the notion that the very basis of these rules was in 
the 'first instance, influenced by customs prevalent in those times, and hence 
their limited relevancy. In fact, Ibn 'Abidln goes further, and argues, that such 
rules (Le. formulated by former jurists) should be replaced by a "new 'urf'. 
71 Ibid., p. 6. 












In particular, Ibn 'Abidin, holds that if those previous jurists were living in the 
period in which he was writing they in turn would endorse the views espoused 
in that period. In other words, they would succumb to the logic that "a new 
'urf' should replace rules formulated by former jurists. 
The above mentioned view seems to find ample support in an earlier jurist, 
al-Qarafi (d.1285) when he questions the legitimacy of fatawB (legal verdicts) 
that "are deduced on the basis of habits and customs prevailing at the time" 
of their formulation. For al-Qarafithe question simply becomes: what 
happens to these fataw8 when those customs and habits upon which these 
were based change over time? For instance, do these fataw8 become defunct 
or not?74 
I see the above question, that is, on the relevance of fatawa established 
on the strength of "customs" and prevailing" habits" of the period in which the 
fatawa are issued as a strong indicator of the significance of custom in Ibn 
'Abidin's reading of how Islamic law operates. This point finds support in the 
following statement by Ibn 'Abidin: 
Let it be known that Muhammad Ibn 'Abidin applied 'Utf(custom) 
to justify many issues ... and Fakhr ai-Islam agreed ... 'any issue 
established on the basis of 'urf is similar to that which is sanctioned 
by legal evidence' ... And it is mentioned in a/- MabsUt that any issue 
affirmed by 'urf is similar to that which is ascertained by textual 
'd 75 eVI ence ... 
74 Jackson, Islamic Law and State, pp. 129-130 











Furthermore, Ibn 'Abidfn's strong views on the status of 'wi, specifically the 
"general" lurf is further strengthened by his assertion that on the basis of 
general 'urf even the preferential status of analogy or qiyas becomes nullified. 
In other words, despite the fact that qiyas in the hierarchy of sources of 
Islamic law rates amongst "the primary sources", in this instance it is 
sacrificed for 'urf. 76 
At this point it is worth reflecting on some of the examples that Ibn <4bidin 
provides to show how a general 'urf can replace or supersede rules 
formulated by earlier jurists. For instance, amongst other examples, he cites 
the permissibility of hiring someone for teaching the Qur/an as opposed to the 
view held by earlier jurists that prohibits such a practice. Accordingly, Ibn 
'Abidin by invoking 'wi, contextualises the views held by these jurists. For 
example, in the case of the former ruling, that is, prohibition of paying those 
who taught Our/an, Ibn 'Abidin argues that it was based on the fact that it was 
the responsibility of the state to do so. In other words, the state's duty to pay 
teachers of Our/an was then the prevailing "custom". Therefore, the logical 
conclusion according to Ibn 'Abidin is that in lieu of II the state" no longer 
responsible for paying teachers of Our/an, Islamic law does not prohibit 
individuals or communities undertaking the responsibility of paying those 
teachers. 
Again the effect of general 'urf is illustrated in the issue of business 
transactions. This view for example, finds support in the maxim expounded 
by Ibn 'Abidin that a " a matter recognised as customary amongst the 











merchants is regarded as if agreed upon".n In other words, since the 
transaction is recognised as customary amongst "merchants", it is in a sense 
like Ita matter established on custom" and hence its legitimacy.78 A good 
example here is the transaction known in those days as a/-Sabtiyya, which 
entails the practice of paying on Saturdays. This was a commonly acceptable 
transaction in the merchant community amongst the cities of Cairo, Beirut and 
surrounding areas.79 Elaborating on this, Mahmassani writes that: 
if a merchant sold a commodity to a purchaser without 
agreement as to the time or manner of payment and if it 
was customary for merchants to obtain the price by weekly 
instalments, then the contract of sale should be interpreted 
to this particular custom.ao 
What is clear from these examples, is that first, legal rules, especially those 
based on the strength furf or in some other contexts, mas/aha, can be . . 
nullified through the agency of prevailing custom or 'urf (Le., payment and 
non-payment of teachers of Our'an). In other words, by invoking the 
relevancy of 'urf, jurists adapt the law to changing circumstances. Second, 
'urfin the context of these examples becomes the tool for contextualising the 
law or "text", for instance, the practice of a/-Sabtiyya, is a good indication of 
this. 
A point must be made though, regarding what Ibn 'Abidin has termed 
"special' urf' - here he rules that "it cannot be followed" as a general rule, but 
77 Ibn 'Abidin, "al- 'Urf', p.20 
78 Ibid., p. 15. 
79 Ibid. 











only as a specific rule. The point nonetheless, in either case is that 'utihas 
the capacity to change rules. Arguably, this particular reading of 'uti by Ibn 
'Abidin, positions custom as a legitimate source of Islamic law. As pointed out 
before, this propensity for' uti "to change some rules", and to "limit the text", is 
what prompted some scholars like AI- Qarafi(d. 1285) for instance to attach 
importance to 'uti (custom) as a "definite source".81 
In short, what is then apparent from the thrust of Ibn 'AbidTn's discourse is 
that it liberates or "rehabilitates" 'uti (to use a phrase from Libson) to a 
prominent status. However, I wish to point out here, that whilst this is the 
apparent meaning in this jurist's discourse on 'uti, Ibn 'Abidih 
pronouncements are nevertheless, located within the normative discourse of 
classical legal theory on 'utf. 
Conclusion 
It can be summed up that Ibn 'Abidin's discourse on 'uti is pragmatic. The 
textual authority is subjected to the primacy of the social environment. This 
for example is supported by his notion that a general' uti has the capacity to 
change even some rules based on textual authority (see p.8) 
In privileging the primacy of the social environment over the inflexibility of 
the textual influence, Ibn 'Abidin dispels the myth of the marginality of 
custom. In other words, the rules that the jurist draws are informed by the 
social practice of the contemporary period, rather than blind holding to 
tradition or "previous rulings" based on the authority of the text. 











What the aforementioned entails, is that in constructing rules, the text is 
freed from the past and read in the present moment or epoch, hence his 
assertion that a "new 'uti" must replace "an old one". What is crucial to note 
here is that occasionally Ibn 'Abidin does depart from the more conservative 
tendencies. By this I mean tendencies that totally deny legitimacy to 'uti as a 
legitimate source, like for example al-Shafi'fs position. What is discernible 
here, is that Ibn 'Abidin remains loyal to what Hallaq has termed the "classical 
hermeneutic" in Islamic jurisprudence (see pp.1B-19). In other words, the 
jurist has not departed from the classical normative discourse on what 
constitute "reliable sources", but has merely manipulated the sources to his 
advantage for the purposes of elucidating how law is formulated. Arguably, 
this strategy is useful insofar as it saves the jurist from accusations of 
blasphemy and innovation, which eventually discredits the jurist and his 
postulations. 
Finally, it can thus be concluded that Ibn 'Abidin's discourse does at least 
reflect pragmatism in his conceptual reading and pronouncement on custom. 
However, the "hermeneutic grip" of the past militates against the jurist, and 
hence the reluctance to assign a formal status to 'uti as a legal prinCiple. In 
short, there is a conflict between "theory and praxis". For instance, in 
practise Ibn 'Abidin amply demonstrates that 'uti is a source of law, but fails 
to fully acknowledge that its status is "de facto" that of a primary source.82 
In other words, despite showing that prevailing customs can be relied 
upon as a substitute to text or nass, 'uti in Ibn 'Abidin's discourse is 
























CUrl (custom) in the Captivity of Tradition 
Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the tenacity of doctrine, or its tyranny which 
grips the jurist by exploring Ibn 'Abidin's discourse on custom, Arguably, it is 
this "tyranny" that has engendered a rigid formalisation of the sources of 
Islamic law in their hierachization and hence the reluctance to shift from such 
a position, This also explains the apparent inconsistency in Ibn 'Abidin's 
discourse on the status of custom Cuff), Arguably, custom mediated through 
such a paradigm is in the captivity of tradition. As noted, it is a tradition that 
does not accept the primacy of custom as an independent legitimate source, 
As an extension of the argument in the previous chapter, here I seek to 
probe further, the assertion that Islamic law is by and large "a jurist's law"(see 
p.4), For instance, I have noted that whilst Ibn 'Abidin amply "demonstrates 
that 'Ulfis a source of law", he nevertheless, upholds the classical view held 
by most Muslim jurists (I.e, the non-recognition of 'urt as a formal source), 
Viewed from the latter point, it is then easier to understand the ramifications of 
what is implied by tyranny of doctrine - a doctrine that imprisons Muslim jurists 
in their postulations on Islamic law? Here, more importantly, I want to show 
the contradiction that permeates the discourse of Muslim jurists in their 











Musl im jurists appears to show a marg inal status to 'Ufi (custom), when 
critically examined, the primacy of 'Ufi is easily discernible. For instance, 
almost all of the jurists are in agreement that' urf plays a central role not only 
as "an extraneous source" but as a dynamic principle on which the very 
formulation of rules is based upon (see pp.48-50). Put differently, 'urf 
provided the context on which the very 'sacred text' was negotiated and 
mediated. A critical reflection on the methodology of the founding jurists, for 
instance, shows that it was greatly influenced by prevailing customs or 'urf as 
a central point of reference. For example, it is worth noting Khallaf's 
observation that among the Hanafischolars, the influence of 'urfwas so 
strong "that some of the differences of opinions in their rulings were solely 
influenced by the impact of custom ('Urf)". Again, Khallaf makes another 
curious observation regarding the effect of custom on Muslim jurists. For 
instance, he argues that it was the impact of custom that compelled al-Shafj'j 
to change some of his legal rulings he upheld strongly when he came to Egypt 
from Baghdad. On this he writes: "and when al-Shafi'j settled in Egypt, he 
changed some of the rulings he upheld when he was still in Baghdad". 83 
The points I have cited above underpins the significance of 'urf and its 
centrality in influencing the thinking of the jurist. For instance, in the context 
of these examples, the impact of 'urfwas so profound to the extent of shaping 
the very methodologies of these respective jurists (lianafi and Shafi7). If the 
effect of 'urfwas such that it would influence the methodology of these early 
jurists, that Islamic legal theory has failed to acknowledge its independence 
as a legitimate primary source is, to say the least, puzzling. Parts of the 










problem lies in the fact that 'urf, in spite of its appropriation by jurists, when 
invoked, remains hidden under other legal principles (like ijma', istit:Jsan or 
mas/aha). To highlight this latter point, I will refer to this problem as the . . 
dialectic of 'urf. 
The dialectic of 'Uri: 'Uri disguised as ma~/aJ.la 
By the dialectic of 'Uti, I refer specifically to the contradiction that permeates 
56 
legal scholarship in its treatment of turf. As noted previously, the treatment of 
'urfin legal scholarship is marked by a discourse that is steeped within the 
existing tradition of Islamic jurisrisprudence, such a tradition does not favour 
turf as an independent formal source. This dichotomy is better expressed by 
the term dialectic. 
I use the term dialectic here, in its philosophical sense, rather than as a 
Marxian nomenclature. If in the philosophical and Kantian sense, "dialectic" is 
a type of argument that dresses up "fallacious reasoning in pseudological 
garb,,84, it will not be an exaggeration to contend that the discourse of Muslim 
jurists on 'urf can be explained in similar terms, that is, in the Kantian sense. 
Now, if in the context of this discussion on 'urf, we were to borrow this 
Kantian usage, it will not be out of place to contend that this is exactly what 
Muslim legal theory as articulated by the jurists has done to 'urf. 
As a way of elucidating my contentions, here, I will look at other discourses 
on 'urf by two additional jurists. These will be contrasted and compared with 
Ibn 'Abidin's discourse. These two jurists are Sha!ibi (d. 1388 CE) and Kha"af 
(d.1956 CE). The choice of these two jurists is by no means arbitrary. First, 











these represent two distinct historical periods. For instance, if the former 
represents the medieval era characterised as the period of "maturation" in 
legal theory (represented by Shatibi), the latter represents the modern period. 
The latter is a period characterised by the challenge and imperative to 
formulate a "new theory of law" or more appropriately a new methodology. 
Such a methodology, it is argued, is aimed at making Islamic law more 
intelligible in order to meet the demands of the modern and contemporary 
period.85 
Second, the importance of selecting these two jurists is useful, in that, it 
provides a further case study on how the problem of I urf is mediated in the 
context of both the classical and modern periods. This helps to throw further 
light on my central thesis - a thesis that argues for the centrality of custom 
Curt) as an independent legitimate source, notwithstanding its hitherto 
marginal status. 
In starting with Shatibi, I will not present a detailed account of Sha!ibT, for 
Khallid Masud's Islamic legal Philosophy: A Study of Abu /shaq A/-Shatibi's . . 
Ute and Thought, already provides a very detailed work on Shatibi. 86 My 
interest here is only on ShatiDi's discourse on 'Uft. As noted elsewhere, 
Sha!ibT as a legal scholar represents the "culmination" of maturity in the 
formulation of Islamic legal theory. This point is well captured by Hallaq, 
when he observes that Sha!ibi represents the: 
Culmination of an intellectual development that started as early as 
the fourth/tenth century. By his time, legal theory had reached 
such high level of maturity that it was capable of being entirely remolded ... 
85 See for instance, Rahman, Islam and Modernity, p.l8. 
86 See Khalid Masud, Islamic Legal Theory: A Study of Abii IslJaq al-ShatibT's Life and Thought (Delhi: 










while maintaining its traditional function of discovering the law 
and regulating its continual creation and, to some extent, functioning. 87 
It is discernible from the above quote that Sha~ibT occupies an important 
position in the study of Islamic law, especially in the area of its legal theory. 
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Given this important status of Shatibi, our discussion on custom would have a 
serious gap if we were to ignore his pronouncements on 'uri (custom). 
Therefore, a focus on Sha!ibT, helps to weigh Ibn 'Abidin discourse against 
that of another jurist and scholar who represents a period earlier than his, but 
also a different school of thought (i.e. the Maliki school). 
Sha~ibi's discourse on 'url(custom) 
It must be noted here, that focus will not be on Shatibi's entire discourse on 
'urf', but on some of the more pertinent pronouncements that he makes 
regarding its status. What follows then, is a summary of Shatibi's views on 
'urt. 
A careful reading of Sha~ibi's legal philosophy shows that custom is very 
much at the centre of his legal thought, especially as it deals with legal 
change. I do not deny the widely accepted Shatibi's central thesis, which 
accentuates the principle of ma~/af)a as the axis of his legal philosophy. 
However, a scrutiny of his discourse on custom ('urf), uncovers the contention 
I have stated earlier, and that is, 'uri is often mediated through the garb of 
another legal principle. For example, in Sha!ibi's case, it is mediated through 
his theory of ma$/af)a. In other words, through the principle of ma$/af)a, the 
status of 'uri is obfuscated, with the attendant result that ma~/af)a is 










accentuated at the expense 'urf. In my view, naturally, this obfuscates the 
position of custom as a prominent source and further entrenches its 
marginalisation. 
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First, because the classical theories do not grant prominent status to 'urf, 
what the jurists have tended to do, is to engage in what' have called "the 
discourse of denial and acceptance" in so far as the status of 'urf is 
concerned. This discourse of "denial and acceptance" is nowhere evident 
than in ShatibTs treatment of 'urf. It is worth looking at a few examples to see 
exactly how this happens. 
Sha!ibi in his fascination with "the relationship between shan'a and ada, (or 
'urf)", asserts that in some cases shan'a can change custom and vice versa. 
In other words, this view implies that "when change takes place within an ada 
('urf), it also affects a change in the rule of shari'a". 88 In other words, the 
shar?a has to adjust itself within the changing context of custom. Naturally, 
this entails that shan'a within such a context must also admit change. Now, if 
change in custom can force change "in the rule of shan'a" ,is custom in this 
context then not ratio legis and therefore, a primary source? 
It is also worth noting, that Sha~ibi has emphasised the importance of "the 
relationship of shan'a toCada" as opposed to "between shan'a and 'aqr or 
reason. As a Maliki jurist trlis can be understandable, in that this school has 
placed more emphasis on 'amal or social practice, (herein 











read as turf or custom)89. For instance, in trivialising the notion that the 
rational people ('uqa/a) were able "to know good and evil by reason alone", 
Sha!ibi argued that" this was possible" in that these values are easily 
manifested intada or habitual norms, that is, customs of the society. 
Accordingly, he asserts that it is precisely because of this reason that "the 
shari'a has not rejected' ada or 'urf entirely". Sha\ibi also contends that the 
"shan'a" has in fact "confirmed most of theCada practiced by the people in the 
Pre-Islamic period,,90. For instance, laws pertaining to diya (blood money), the 
hajj (pilgrimage) and interestingly the jum~h (Muslim's Friday congregation) or 
what was then called Aruba (ancient Arabic name signifying the Friday 
sermons), are good examples of how shan'a has "confirmed" and sustained 
most of the customs prevalent in the pre-Islamic era. 
Again, in Sha!ibi's comments on khamr or wine, the penchant to invoke 
custom by this jurist is more pronounced. Masud, for example, states that 
Shatibi has argued that the reason khamr (wine) drinking was left intact and 
not abolished immediately by the shan'a was based on the habitual practices 
or customs of the pre-Islamic days. The reason it was abolished only after the 
Qur'anic verses on khamrwere revealed, Shatibi contends, was influenced by 
the principle that it was harmful to the wellbeing and welfare of the 
community. In other words, shafj'a can also change custom and vice versa. 
A point to be noted though, is that when the change takes place within 
89 See Muhammad Shalabi, Uful al-Fiqh ai-Is/ami (Beirut: Dar al-Nahdat al-Arabiya, 1986), p.321. 











custom, that change also affects "a change in rule of shariel'. 91 What is 
discernible here, is that whilst custom has been the main point of reference in 
Sha!ibi's discourse, this is, nevertheless, underpinned by the imperative to 
prove the validity of ma~/aJ:1a as a legal principle. That is why, for instance, 
Sha!ibi concludes that Islam accommodates customary practises as long as 
they are in the interest of community (ma~/alya). 
The above point is well illustrated by Masud where he shows that ma~/aJ:1a 
is the pivotal principle under which much of Sha~ibi's legal philosophy is 
anchored. What is discernible within such a scheme, is that 'urf or "ada" is 
readily sacrificed, or is expressed through the idiom of ma~/afJa not 
withstanding its vitality. Arguably, it is such vitality that has in the first 
instance compelled Sha!ibi to rule that shafjla should succumb to custom. In 
mediating' urf through another legal principle, in this case ma$/afJa, what 
Sha!ibi effectively achieves, is the dismissal of 'urf as a prominent source. 
Therefore, ma~/afJa is juxtaposed in lieu of 'urfthus diminishing its 
prominence. 
The foregoing discussion sums Shatibi's views on 'urf. I will now focus on 
Khallafs discourse. Later, both Sha\ibi and Khallaf will be analysed, 
-compared and contrasted, with Ibn 'Abidin's discourse. 
Khallaf's Discourse on turf 
Again, as a measure to weigh Ibn 'Abidin, Khallafs discourse on 'urfis 
exceptionally important. As indicated earlier, the significance of looking at 
Khallaf's discourse on 'urfis two-fold. First, as pointed out, the purpose is to 










situate Ibn 'Abidin within a comparative perspective. Second Khallafs 
discourse serves as a good example for locating the attendant problem 
characterising Islamic jurisprudential discourse in its pursuit for a viable 
theoretical methodology. 
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Furthermore, the importance of Khallafs views on 'ur(, is based on the fact 
that he provides a modern perspective on how 'urf is mediated. This in a 
sense helps to examine the continuities and discontinuities characterising the 
discourse on 'urfin Muslim legal theory. My primary text for Khallafs 
discourse on 'urfis from his work written in Arabic, '11m U~UI a/-Fiqh (Principles 
of Islamic jurisprudence or Islamic legal theory), particularly the section on 
'urf. This is further supported by Hallaq's references to Khall§f in his recent 
work.92 
Again, to avoid repeating the familiar debates, I will only focus here on 
Khallafs pertinent pronouncements on 'urf. This is followed by a summary of 
his discourse. In 11m U$u! al-fiqh, the section dealing with 'urf, Khallaf writes 
assertively, that "in reality 'urfis not an independent or primary source and 
that it is, in most instances, reflected through the principle of ma$lal)a a/-
Mursala". Based on this assumption, he then concludes that "it is not an 










independent source of Islamic law or legal proof'. 93 
'Urfin Khallaf's discourse is classified into two categories. These are 
sound or acceptable custom or '" urf as-satJitl" and corrupt custom or 
undesirable custom or "urf a/-fasid'. Accordingly, sound custom is "what is 
known amongst the people and does not contradict textual evidence".94 
As for corrupt custom, it is also known amongst the people "but contradicts 
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the shafj'a or makes permissible the unlawful like for example riba or interest". 
In exploring his discourse on 'urfthis particular statement holds special 
significance. Arguably, it is through the simplification of this statement that 
most of the ambiguity around turf emanates from. 
First, for many jurists it is a licence to circumscribe 'urfand limit its status 
as a source of law. My concern is that it does not sufficiently account for the 
rulings that are totally based on the strength of custom such that they nullify 
"shafi'a" , as pointed out in Sha~ibi's discourse. It is crucial to note that in order 
to support his claim on 'urf, Khallaf draws on Ibn 'Abidin, and he does so with 
a great sense of respect. Note, for example, how Khallaf makes his point. He 
writes: 
and amongst important maxims are: a/-m'arufi 'urfan ka'/-mashrDti 
Shartan, wa thabit bil-'urfi ka thabit bi/-Na~$ (What is known by custom 
has a legal binding, and what has the evidence of custom is similar 
to the certainty of the text).95 
The importance of this quote is that it unambiguously asserts the strength of 
custom as a legitimate source of law. Khallaf's discourse on custom is 
93 Khallaf, 'Ilmul Usiil al-Fiqh, p. 91. 
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perhaps well summed up by Hallaq, and I quote him in detail. Hallaq: 
Khallafs vacillation between the tenacious authority of the revealed 
text and the imperatives of legal change is even more evident in his 
discussion of customary practises ('uti) and of their relation to law. 
At first, he seems certain that those practises that conform to the law 
are to be accepted as valid, whereas those that contradict the law must 
be deemed null and void. This certainty, however, does not last; a 
custom that contravenes the dictates of the revealed texts may, after 
all, be legalised. If an unlawful contract or transaction has become 
widespread in a particular society, such as insurance, then necessity 
will override the textual norms.96 
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In addition to the above detailed quote which sums up Khallafs views on 'U1i, 
like Shatibi, Khallaf also held the view that "since customary practice does 
change over time, the law that governs them must change accordingly"(see 
pp.61- 62). Now if the change in custom necessitates a change in "the law 
that governs them",97 it would appear that such a statement as the jurists' 
discourse points, alludes to the primacy of custom as a source of law. 
A Critique: Contrasts and Comparisons 
This section concludes by offering a critique of both Sha\ibi's and Khallafs 
discourse on 'urt, and also compares these with Ibn 'Abidin's discourse. 
In examining the discourses of both Shatibi and Khallaf, and comparing these 
with Ibn 'Abidin, a striking similarity permeates almost all of them. 
Their discourse on 'urf can be summed up as being one of denial and 
acceptance. It is denial in the sense that 'urfis denied the status of a primary 
principle as an independent source of law, whilst, at times it is acknowledged 












as a legitimate source to the extent of changing "the law that governs" it. In 
other words, custom has the propensity to change a legal ruling that has the 
support of "textual" evidence. Custom, in this context as the unwritten text, 
replaces the written text. In short, the praxis of the community becomes the 
legitimising agent. 
Second and most importantly, it is noticeable that 'urf as expounded in 
these discourses plays a central role in the reasoning of the jurists particularly 
in their attempts to make pronouncements on novel situations, 'urfin such 
instances is constantly invoked. The irony, however, is that, in spite of this 
prominence, it is not pronounced as a primary source or independent source, 
but a secondary or an appendage to aid other sources when they are 
"ambiguous" or "silent". Or, as in the case of Shatibi, custom or 'urfis invoked 
to plead the legitimacy of mas/aha.98 
• * 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the question of whether the inability to attach 
primacy to custom, that is, as a primary source is caused by ambiguity in what 
constitutes sources of Islamic law, or is it a problem of tyranny of doctrine in 
the classical legal theory of Islamic jurisprudence? 
In response to the above question, I have argued that the failure to assign 
primacy to 'urf or custom as an independent and primary source of law, stems 
from the jurists imprisonment by tradition rather than "irrationality" in sources 
of Islamic law. In particular, 'urf read as a primary source, provides not only a 
98 This point is 3.\so emphasised by Muhammad Mu~tafa Shalabi in the following words: "waf-Imam 
M5liki 'amala bi! 'urfi wa 'iabarahu naw 'an minat ma~/a/:la (and Imam Mill utilised 'urfand has 
considered it as part of masfaha). See Shalabi's Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami[Islamic Jurisprudence] (Beirut: 










plausible theory, but equally a methodological alternative for an intelligible 
reading of Islamic law (I am elaborating more on this last point in the next 
chapter). In short, in our context, reading turf as a primary source, implies 
theoretically speaking, going back to the origins, and deriving guidelines for 














Reconfiguring 'Uri (Custom) as a Legitimate Source: 
Methodological and Theoretical Considerations 
The autonomy of the past had to be recognised. 
But I always knew that history, in the end, is an 
interpretation of 'facts' in history. It is like and old 
fabric handed down to us from the past; we do not 
fully understand its original pattern ... 
- S. N. Mukherjee 
This chapter concludes the discussion on 'urf. Here I locate the study within a 
broad theoretical framework that I outlined in the introduction (see pp.6-8). 
This helps to highlight the central thesis underpinning this study more clearly, 
and that is: revisiting the status of 'urf in Islamic jurisprudence the aim is to 
prove that it has always been prominent, often serving as a primary source. 
Naturally, this stance negates the myth of the marginal status of 'urfthat has 
now become synonymous with the "authentic" and "dominant" view on the 
subject. 
In addition to the above, at the theoretical and methodological level, it is 
my contention, that assigning prominence to 'urf as a source of law, has 
amongst other benefits, the potential to highlight the "crisis of epistemology" 
within Islamic jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it is not within the scope of the 










the areas where the problem lies. 
The metaphor of an "old fabric handed down" as indicated in the opening 
epigraph, is a powerful one for encapsulating the treatment of curtin Muslim 
jurisprudential discourse. It is, however, as a "subtext" to this discourse that 
this metaphor becomes useful for stating my argument more forcefully. 
The key phrase in this concluding chapter is "reconfiguring 'urf'. 
Reconfiguring, to cite Vernon Robbins99, means, amongst other things, 
"recounting" in a manner that makes the latter event "new" in relation to the 
previous. In other words, what Robbins implies is that in terms of similarity, 
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the "new event is similar to a previous one" and as such "the new replaces or 
outshines the previous". It is, therefore, in the process of outshining the 
previous event that the new is "reconfigured" and hence its apparent 
newness. 100 Although Robbins is referring to a slightly different context, such 
a statement is, nevertheless, deployable in the context of my discussion on 
'Urt. For it is as the "reconfigured" that 'urt"outshines" its previous designation. 
This in turn renders any claims of its prominence in Islamic jurisprudence to 
appear as a "new hermeneutic", a rupture with the past, an innovation, and 
therefore, untenable. 
However, as I have attempted to show, 'urt "reconfigured" does not stem 
from an innovation or a total rupture with the past- but is located in "the 
previous event"- or its original status in the past. In such a past 
99 Vernon Robbins, Exploring the Texture of Texts: A Guide to Socio- Rhetorical Guide (Pennsylvania: 












(past referring to the prophetic period and the early subsequent periods) 'uti 
or custom was marked by its prominence in legal formulation. Put differently, 
custom then served as a primary source or determinant for negotiating and 
interpreting the 'sacred text' of Islam or shan'a in its legalistic sense. 
It can thus be seen that my reading borrows heavily on original 
understandings of the process of law-making in early Muslim society. Within 
the context of such a past, "custom" although not officially sanctioned, 
featured prominently in the hierarchy of what constituted sources of Islamic 
law. For example, it is a known fact that the Maliki school, in particular, based 
most of its rulings and legal theory on the strength of the communal praxis of 
Madina- called "Madinan 'amaf'. AlthoUgh this point has been mentioned in 
previous works, the recent work by Dutton, is arguably the most eloquent to 
capture the centrality of custom in Islamic legal theory, especially as 
expounded in the Maliki school. 101 
Thanks to this recent work, there is at least a text that lends support to the 
view I have put forward on the status of custom. Therefore, I am not going to 
offer a lengthy discussion to back my claims on the prominence of custom in 
Islamic law. Here the author argues forcefully, that in Malik's Muwatta lies the 
"first written formulation of Islam in practice that becomes Islamic law". The 
importance of this work is underpinned by the centrality it attaches to custom 
or what it refers to as " 'amal of Madina". Of course, I do not suggest that I 
101 Yasin Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law: The Quran, Muwatta and Medina 'Amat (Surrey: 











accept Dutton's thesis, which is an exposition of Maliki's Muwa.t!a, wholesale. 
The fundamental difference is that whereas Dutton argues that 'amal is 
text expressed through the practice of the community, that is, the Madinan 
community, my own emphasis is that the text is not only expressed or 
reflected upon the 'amal (custom), but 'urf itself (read 'ama! by Dutton) 
mediates and informs the text and its application, and hence a creative 
blending of "text and context"(see my discussion in chapter 2 and 3). Now 
this is different from merely over emphasising that the text is "expressed 
through 'ama/" (practice of the community). If this is so, the question is, to 
what extent is such an emphasis also not based on the notion of a "juristic 
device" as pointed out by Hallaq, and therefore, fall on the utilitarian 
paradigm? However, besides this gripe I am in agreement with Dutton insofar 
as his work brilliantly shows the vitality of custom as a viable alternative for 
reformulating Islamic law. This is what Dutton has called the "third view". He 
explains such a third view in the following words: flit is the contention of the 
present study that there is a third view which has not yet been sufficiently 
examined (if even recognised) by modern scholars, whether Muslim or 
otherwise". 102 
Given this assertion by Dutton, I can therefore, argue with ease that my 
discourse thus far on 'urf or custom in this dissertation is an attempt to 
examine "what has not yet been sufficiently examined" (to cite Dutton). In 
other words, in engaging the status of custom within Islamic jurisprudence, I 
am in a sense beginning to explore the "third view". The question is what 











exactly does such a third view entail? For whilst Dutton points towards such a 
view he does not fully elaborate what are its parameters. The closest he 
comes to explaining such a view is to state the following: 
The third view allows us a fundamentally different perspective 
on Islamic legal history where the true expression of the law is 
seen as being preserved not in a corpus of texts but in the actions, 
or 'amal, of men103 
However, notwithstanding the limitation, the point about Dutton's statement is 
that custom ('urt) or 'amal becomes "a true expression of the law" rather than 
being buried "in a corpus of texts" or nass. The value of Dutton's contribution .. 
here is that at the minimal level, at least it helps in building a case for the 
validity custom as a crucial prinCiple in the development of Islamic legal 
theory. Informed by such a perspective, I believe my own discussion thus far 
(Le., in previous chapters) on the centrality of custom in Islamic legal theory 
finds sufficient support in Dutton's thesis. In particular, the point I wish to 
stress here is that if custom did function as one of the primary sources, 
therefore, it can still occupy such a role in the modern period. And as 
Mahmassani has pointed out elsewhere that: 
custom has a/ways played an important part in the history of legal 
systems among various peoples. This role, although relatively minor 
in the present day by comparison with the past, is nevertheless crucial 
and cannot be ignored by present legislation. For custom ... still 
supports, interprets, adjust and revitalises written law. 
It is a link between the past, present, and the future. 104 
Although Mahmassani supports the view that custom is valid only as an 
"extraneous source", I have, nevertheless, quoted him at length here, in that 
103 Ib'd 3 1 ., p .. 











his statement eloquently points to the continued relevance and vitality of 
custom as a source of law. But also more importantly, his statement 
underpins the fact that the view espoused in this dissertation is by no means 
arbitrary. Custom as shown has in practice functioned as a primary source, 
that is, before codification or prior to being overtaken by "written law" or 
shafj'a after its formalisation. This then, vindicates my claim that our 
argument here on the primacy of custom or 'uri, is not a total rupture with the 
past but merely "reconfigures" custom and entrenches its status as a 
prominent source. This, in a nutshell, refutes the myth of it marginal status. 
A Theoretical Point of Departure? 
Before I proceed to state my theoretical point of departure, I deem it 
necessary to first sum up this study as it has progressed thus far. The aim is 
to allow for the discussion that follows to be placed within its proper 
perspective. 
In examining the discourse on 'uri in the previous chapters, I have shown 
that in praxis 'uri does function as a legitimate source in the formulation of 
Islamic law than the jurists would admit. For example, in Chapter one, 
through the variety of scholars examined, it is discernible that most do allude 
to the utility of 'urias a prominent source (see pp. 30 - 40). 
In chapter Two, which was a case study on Ibn 'Abidin's discourse on 'urf, 
the attendant contradictions between theory and practice were highlighted. 
For example, in looking at Ibn 'Abidin's discourse on 'urf, it is clear that whilst 
his discourse denies legitimacy to 'uri, nevertheless, it invokes 'uri as a 











discussions on 'urf (custom) forward, Chapters Two and Three in 
particular, have demonstrated that the reluctance to accord prominence to this 
source is partly due to the dominance of classical doctrine in Islamic 
jurisprudence. As argued, such a classical doctrine is based on an 
epistemology that does not recognise 'urf as a primary source, but only as an 
"extraneous source". 
Accordingly, invoking the principle of "extraneous" sources, these jurists 
proceed to argue that Islamic law is in fact "mutable". It is precisely at this 
point, that is, "mutability" or "immutability" of Islamic law, where my theoretical 
thrust in this dissertation makes a point of departure. Such a question I 
believe is sufficiently addressed in a number of works dealing with Islamic law 
in the modern period or in modernist discourse on Islamic law.105 
My particular concern is to show that whilst most works on Islamic law as 
far as highlighting the "flexible" nature of Islamic law, cannot be flawed, they 
are, nevertheless still trapped in the "classical hermeneutic". By specifically 
looking at custom or 'urf as a primary source, I am in a sense proposing an 
alternative approach. The stance I adopt here is that of attempting to move 
away from recycling old discourses that are preoccupied with proving the 
relevance or irrelevance of Islamic law to meet changing circumstances. 
In particular, I begin to engage the very foundational epistemology of 
Islamic law - an area I believe that is largely neglected. By epistemological 
105 A similar observation is made by Moosa in a recent review essay of Nyazee 's Theories of Islamic 











crisis in the context of this study, I am referring to the arrangement of the 
hierarchy in what constitutes sources of Islamic law. What has been passed 
down as the primary sources in this hierarchy has over a period of history 
become unchangeable. In particular, it is this arrangement of sources and 
their prioritisation as "primary" and "secondary". that has created a hierarchy 
of sources that has become non-negotiable. Arguably. this has contributed in 
putting Islamic law in an "epistemological crisis". Subsequently, due to 
doctrinal tyranny, any attempt to reformulate such an epistemology does not 
find accommodation. A key feature of such doctrinal tyranny or "classical 
hermeneutic", as we have shown elsewhere in this study (see p.18), is that, it 
does not recognise custom as a primary source. 
Reading luff, therefore, as a primary source, presents a rupture with the 
classical hermeneutic and creatively engages this epistemological crisis. This 
approach has also the added potential to contribute towards an alternative 
methodology that can free Islamic law from its present predicament. Such a 
predicament is seemingly well captured by Hallaq.106 To marshal my remarks 
here; I want to draw extensively from Hallaq's work. He summed up 
succinctly the different strands underpinning calls for the need to reinterpret 
Islamic law. Hallaq's work, will therefore, serve as a useful springboard 'from 
which the challenge for an alternative theoretical approach and methodology 
can be taken up. 
I must note from the start, that Hallaq's work does not attempt to explore 
alternative theories and methodologies that can be applied to Islamic law, it 











only exposes the debates and the major players involved in attempts to offer 
alternative readings and interpretations of Islamic law. In particular, Hallaq 
distinguishes between two strands: These he describes as the "utilitarian" and 
"liberal" approaches. The difference between the two approaches is that the 
former rationalises the existing status quo, instead of "prescribing a new legal 
theory or reformulated methodology". On the contrary, the latter, that is, 
liberalists "remained, and continue" in Hallaq's view, "to stand, outside the 
current main stream" of law formulation in Muslim societies. In other words, 
the discourse of the latter, as it were, continues to be met with "stiff 
resistance" by Muslim orthodoxy. Hallaq's work here is extremely useful, in 
that whilst it does not put forward an alternative blue print for an alternative 
theory and methodology, nonetheless, it does sketch a scenario that 
highlights the difficulties encountered in the pursuit to formulate viable legal 
theories for Islamic law.107 
To focus my disclJssion I want to return to Ha"aq's notion of the two 
strands in attempts to reinterpret Islamic law, that is, the "utilitarian" and 
"liberal" approaches. The problem with the utilitarian approach, as Hallaq has 
argued, is that the utilitarians are trapped by the classical hermeneutic of 
Islamic legal theory, thus their postulations are far from being new theories 
but instead "perpetuate the status quO".108 In other words, what is proposed, 
as new theories are simply "juristic devices" from the existing traditional legal 












theory.109 Of course, this is not to deny the creativity and inventiveness of 
these alternative devices. The problem, however, is that these devices do not 
offer a methodology that can "bring into a dialectical relationship the 
imperatives of the revealed texts and the realities of the modern worl d". 11 0 
On the contrary, what sets the liberals apart from the utilitarians, is that the 
thrust of the liberal approach "consists of understanding revelation as both 
text and context". Put differently, the text is read and interpreted as located in 
its modern context or what Hallaq has termed the context of "modern 
sOciety".111 It is worth citing Hallaq more at length here to get a full 
sense of this point. Hallaq: 
The connection between the revealed text and modern society 
does not turn upon a literalists hermeneutic, but rather upon 
an interpretation of the spirit and broad interpretation behind the 
specific language of the texts. 112 
If the utilitarians, render the revealed text "subservient" to the "imperatives" of 
the "juristic devices"(Le., public interest, need and necessity), it is the 
liberalists, whom Hallaq argues, have given Islamic law a much more 
"Islamically committed system of thought". The problem with the "utilitarian" 
approach though, as Hallaq has shown, is that Islamic law becomes literal 
and "textually" submissive rather than a response or outcome of a law that is 
109 Ibid., p.231 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., p.249. 
11:2 Ibid., p.254. I must hasten to add at this point that in citing Hallaq in full here does not suggest that 
he necessarily views developments in Islamic Law in a Favourable light- but only serve to highlight the 











mediated through creative "textual/contextual analysis". 113 
In other words, there is a poverty of a viable methodology that can 
effectively negotiate and mediate between the text and its context. 
Accordingly, it is this latter approach (liberalists) that Hallaq (despite its 
rejection by orthodoxy) credits with being a "respectable methodology" in tune 
with "Islamic legal values".114It is not my intention to judge which of the two 
approaches is more committed to Islam as Hallaq has done, but to show why 
the alternative I propose attempts to bridge the gap between the two 
approaches, and why I recommend its viability. First, notwithstanding their 
conservative nature, the success of the utilitarians lies in the fact that their 
"theories" were at least implementented "practically". In other words, they 
have been applied and put into operation. Apparently, this is the mark of their 
success, to take a cue from Hallaq. 115 However, the problem still remains, that 
is, their preoccupation with tradition has rendered them ineffective, hence they 
have not really offered any alternative methodology. And if they do offer 
alternative theory, it is as Moosa notes elsewhere "unsatisfactory". On the 
contrary, the latter, that is, the liberalists, with their "intelligible" methodology 
have at least offered a fresh outlook, as Hallaq puts it, one that is "legally and 
intellectually far more rigorous and convincing ... ".116 But here too, the 
challenge still is, how can the liberal perspective also receive a favourable 
response? To put the question differently, how can the gap between these 
two poles be narrowed? And also, how can the insights offered by both these 
poles, that is, "intelligibility" of the liberalist approach and the "loyalty to 
113 Ibid., p.254. 
114 Ibid., p.262. 
115 Ibid., p.254. 










tradition" of the utilitarians, be harnessed and deployed creatively to offer a 
relatively acceptable methodology and theory? 
78 
In responding to the above set of questions, I want to first make my 
position clear regarding the view taken by Hallaq. I do not believe as Hallaq 
has asserted that the utilitarians are less committed to Islamic legal values-
hence my assertion that a common ground between the two approaches is 
possible. Therefore, it is in the context of this quest for a common ground that 
my recommendation can make sense. What I propose is that, it is in 
"reconfiguring" 'urt as a primary source, that the two poles can possibly be 
reconciled. Arguably, such a reconciliation would seek to entrench the best in 
both approaches, thus in the process bring a synthesis for a viable theory. 
Arguably, elevating custom as a legitimate source contains both the 
utilitarian and liberal strands and thus holds both in a healthy tension by 
taking a middle path. It is through the ability to proffer this synthesis that this 
proposed alternative can possibly mediate and thus contribute towards 
addressing the epistemological crisis facing Islamic law. In so doing, the 
theory moves away from rigidity but renegotiates the hierarct"lisation of 
sources in Islamic jurisprudence. By so doing, it deals with the foundational 
epistemology. It is in this instance, I wish to argue, wherein lies the strength 
of the liberal strand. For custom, by its very nature, is not textually bound, but 
informs the text. It becomes a textual! contextual based methodology. It does 
so without discarding elements of the traditional methodology, but simply 
"reconfigures" such a methodology. Arguably, in such a sense it is not totally 
new, but a return to the original framework. Of course, this is done through 











As our narrative on 'wf has shown, it is through the historical process that 
lurf has shifted from prominence as a reliable source to a marginal status 
(within the hierarchy of sources). But also, if history is an interpretation of 
"facts", when we interpret the process of the hierarchisation of the sources of 
Islamic law, we can say that we are figuratively speaking about returning to 
the original framework. Therefore, a return to such an original framework is a 
return to a tradition where turf once enjoyed prominence (see pp. 21- 27). 
Furthermore, if we still stretch the metaphor of an "old fabric" passed "from 
the past"(see opening epigraph) and relate it to Islamic law (particularly as it 
pertains to its theory and methodology), there is a sense in which we can say 
its "original fabric" or "pattern" has been lost, or misunderstood. In short, 
positing 'urf as a paradigm for reinterpreting and reformulating Islamic law, is, 
arguably a quest "to understand" the original fabric or pattern (read Islamic 
law) and how it was originally formulated. Herein lies the thrust of my 
argument. It appears new in the sense in which Vernon Robbins talks about 
the "reconfigured" as a "new event" that outshines "the previous". However, 
on close scrutiny, it is a call for a return to the origins where custom featured 










Jurisprudence is a science of both understanding and 
misunderstanding of law. As the most generalised and 
abstract form of legal discourse it reveals the categories 
and concepts in which lawyers and jurists think about law. 
- Valerie Kerrish117 
If as Kerrish asserts, "jurisprudence is a source of both understanding and 
80 
misunderstanding of law", I think this is very much the case with Muslim jurists 
and their approach to Islamic law. In particular, "misunderstanding" is at best 
pronounced in the views of Muslim jurists regarding the acceptance of custom 
as a legitimate source of Islamic law. I have argued in this dissertation that, 
except for a few, the discourse of the majority of Muslim jurists' denies custom 
the status of a legitimate or formal source. When they accept custom, it is 
only on the basis of a marginal source. Or as I have shown in chapter 3, that 
custom (' urf) is often mediated through the medium of another legal principle, 
like, for instance, ma~/ara (and hence my assertion about the dialectic of turf, 
see p.S6). Accordingly, based on such a legacy, the discourse of most 
Muslim jurists (see chapter 2) does not depart from this classical paradigm, 
that is, where custom is treated as a marginal source. 
The problem with such a classical paradigm is that it obscures the capacity 
of the jurists to bend and constantly reformulate Islamic law to meet change. 











This is what has led some scholars on Islamic law to charge that Islamic law 
is by and large a jurist's law. Now, if discourse connotes "a world of 
meaning"(see p. 41), in examining Ibn 'Abidin's discourse on 'uff, (that was 
compared and contrasted with the discourses of Sha!ibT and Khallaf), I have 
then concluded that what is observable is that' urf as a subtext in the 
discourse of Muslim jurists, functions as a legitimate source of law. In other 
words, notwithstanding the seemingly conformist postulations on 'urfthat 
seems to yield to the classical view, a close examination of the discourse of 
these jurists appears to be liberal and pragmatic on the question of custom as 
a legitimate source. Put differently, the discourse of these jurists demystifies 
the myth that 'urf (custom) is only a marginal source of law as the normative 
discourse in Islamic legal theory has proposed. 
On the basis of the above observations, I have then argued that the 
cause for the denial to grant custom legitimacy can be linked to the 
foundational epistemology of classical legal theory in Islamic law. This is at 
best reflected in the hierarchy of what constitutes "legitimate sources" of such 
a law. Given such a status quo, my concern, besides making a case for the 
acceptance of custom as a legitimate source, was to highlight that part of the 
challenge facing Islamic law and its legal theory is the need to renegotiate the 
arrangement of what constitute the "legitimate" in the hierarchy of its sources 
of law afresh. I have then asserted that it is the unwillingness to engage in a 
critical evaluation of its sources that saddles Islamic jurisprudence with what I 
have referred to as an "epistemological crisis" (see p. 18). Therefore, in 
problematising the hierarchy in the sources of Islamic law, I have then argued 











"rehabilitate" custom as a relevant source, but begins to highlight the inherent 
tensions underpinning the epistemology of traditional legal theory. 
In short, in "reconfiguring" 'urf as a legitimate source, I have argued, that 
this is not an innovation but a return to the "pre-classical" period in legal 
formulation. As noted, in such a context, custom was very much at the centre 
of legal formulation (see chapter 4). 
Finally, in the light of the concerns raised in this study, at the conceptual 
level, I have then argued that custom "rehabilitated" as a primary source 
provides a useful framework towards an alternative theory and naturally a 
methodology for reinterpretation of Islamic law in the contemporary period. 
For custom read as primary source, as indicated, engages directly with 
traditional epistemology rather than seek accommodation as an appendage 
that can be discarded at any given time. This repositioning of custom in the 
hierarchy of sources, in a sense, responds to the challenge posed by most 
modern Muslim legal scholars who bemoan the lack of a viable methodology 
and theory for reformulating and rethinking Islamic law.118 In all, the crux of 
my argument here is that there is nothing sacrosanct about the status 
attached to the accepted hierarchy of sources. In fact as some contemporary 
scholars would show, that other sources that feature prominently "are in 
reality [only] legal instruments"(i.e. consensus or ijma' and analogy or qiyas) 
on which "there is no universal agreement among jurists".119 
Of course, as I have indicated, that, given the limited scope of this study, I 
118 See for instance Rahman 's Islam and Modernity, p.18; see also, 'Alwani's "The sources of Islamic 
jurisprudence: Methodology of Research", 1982, pp. 211-269. See also Moosa's "Languages of 
change in Islamic Law: Redefining Death and Modernity", Islamic Studies Journal, 38:3 (1999), p.312. 
119 Moosa, "Languages of Change in Islamic Law", 1999, p. 307. See also, Abdulah An-Na'im, Toward 
an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Rights, and International Law (New York, Syracuse 











do not pretend to have presented a full methodological alternative framework, 
but have pointed towards such a direction without being fully prescriptive. 
Therefore, what I have reflected upon here is only a recommendation (a 
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